THE COMPARISON OF SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSES BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

There is an extensive secondary literature that speculates about the changes in Turkish security perceptions and policy preferences that have occurred since Turkey’s accession to EU candidate status in 1999. On the one hand, it has been suggested that Turkish and EU threat perceptions and security policy preferences have tended to converge since 1999. On the other hand, it has also been suggested that Turkey’s foreign and security policy elite has itself become more internally consistent in the way that it views the security threats that the country faces and responses to these threats. This dissertation addresses both of these issues. I use a range of secondary sources, academic views, official (Turkish) government policies and statements, and the European Security Strategy to provide a general, impressionistic account of the extent to which Turkish and EU threat perceptions and policies have ‘converged’ in the period since 1999. I present evidence from a survey of the Turkish elite conducted in 2007 as part of the research for this dissertation. Since no equivalent survey was conducted earlier, I am unable to make a definitive characterisation of the ways in which Turkish elite opinion might have changed. However, the results demonstrate conclusively that there is a high level of subjective agreement among the contemporary elite as to the main security challenges that Turkey faces and responses to these challenges.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BLACKSEAFOR: Naval Task Force for the Black Sea

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy

ECP: European Political Cooperation

EDC: European Defence Community

ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy

ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy

ESS: European Security Strategy

EU: European Union

EUFOR: European Force

EUMC: European Union Military Committee

EUMS: European Union Military Stuff

GNI: Gross National Income

GNP: Gross National Product

IFOR: Implementation Force

IMF: International Monetary Fund World Bank

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
KFOR: Kosovo Force

MERCOSUR: Mercado Comun del Cono Sur (Southern Cone Common Market)

MPFSEE: Multinational Peace Force Southeast

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty of Organization

NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

ODA: Official Development Assistance

OIC: Organization of the Islamic Conference

OSCE: Security and Co-operation in Europe

PSC: Political and Security Committee

PKK: Kurdistan Workers Party

RRF: Rapid Reaction Force

SEEBRIG: South-eastern Europe Brigade

SEECP: South-eastern European Cooperation Process

SFOR: Stabilization Force

SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

TDP: Turkish Defence Policy

TRNC: Republic of Northern Cyprus

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

USA: United States of America

USAK: International Strategic Research Organization

WEU: Western European Union

WMDs: Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTO: World Trade Organization
1. INTRODUCTION

This section presents the objective and methodology as well as a brief outline of this dissertation.

1.1. Objective

Security is a significant and complex sub-discipline of International Relations. Since the end of the Cold War there have been changes in the concept of security; not only conventional war or military attack, but also environmental, economic, social, natural disasters and pandemic issues have become the subjects of security policies. New threats, doubtless, have caused changes in the concept of security and threat perceptions. Uncertain and complex threats, such as economic crimes, cyber attack, nuclear attack, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), ethnic conflict, natural disaster and pandemics, human and drug trafficking, illegal migration, organized crime and terrorist attacks have been perceived as the main threats to states, societies and individuals in the contemporary world.

In this context, new policy instruments have been developed to meet these new security threats. The policy preferences of states in response to these threats can be divided into three categorizes: interaction preferences, institutional preferences and instrumental preferences. The interaction preference determines the security policy of a state in terms of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral perspectives. International institutions, such as the UN, NATO, EU, WTO and IMF play important roles in tandem with states in the responses to such threats. The institutional preferences explain which institution or institutions are the most significant for a given state in terms of its security policy. Finally, ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ are the main instrumental preferences against complex and uncertain threats. Besides the ‘hard power’ policies, such as military attack and military operations, ‘soft power’ choices, such as diplomacy, economic and
financial assistance, humanitarian aid, special operations, reconstruction and peacekeeping missions have become new instruments in the struggle against the new threats.

After the end of the Cold War, the European Union has attempted to exert significant political power and become global player in international relations. Thus, it developed the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to establish a common security policy among the member states and to struggle together against threats. In 2003, the EU released the European Security Strategy (ESS), which explains the key security threats, and the forms of responses that can be categorized as ‘interaction, institutional and instrumental preferences’ (Kirchner, 2007a:16-19) against these threats.

Turkey, a member of NATO, is one of the neighbour countries of the EU and a candidate for the full membership of EU. Due to its geo-strategic position, it is an important actor for the EU in terms of its security policy. Hence, there has been a close relationship between Turkey and the EU concerning security issues since the end of the Second World War. Both Turkey and Western European countries struggled together against the Soviet/Communist threat under the protection of NATO. Currently, Turkey’s immediate neighbours -the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East- are also relevant with the EU security. As seen in the past, for instance the Bosnian and Kosovo crises, both parties have attempted to prevent conflicts and ensure stability and peace in the region.

Turkey has located at the centre of one of the most unstable regions in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It found itself in even more a volatile region after the end of the Cold War. It is at the centre of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus where there are ongoing and diverse conflicts. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq after September 11 attack, disputes between the USA and Iran have increased tensions in immediate region of Turkey. Furthermore, it has struggled against a terrorist organization for 25 years.
In general, Turkey pursued an inactive, passive foreign policy until the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, it’s foreign and security policies have begun to change to ensure stability and peace in its immediate neighbourhood, and to meet existing and possible threats since the end of the 1990s. Turkish policymakers believe that, in the new world order, proactive and multilateral policies using both hard and soft power tools, and cooperating with the international institutions must be needed to meet new complex threats. Declaration of Turkey’s candidacy for the EU membership at the Helsinki summit in 1999 has been one of the most important factors which cause changes in Turkish security policy. Development of new security approaches to meet new complex and asymmetric threats after the 11 September 2001 attack, and a pro-European government coming into power since 2002 are other significant factors in new foreign and security policy of Turkey. These factors are all interrelated; the EU officially declared its security policy through a document called ‘European Security Strategy’ after the 9/11 attack. In this term, a pro-European party (the Justice and Development Party) came into power in 2002, and it believes that Turkey’s foreign and security policies should be approximated to EU policies for the full membership. Thus, ‘Europeanization’ process has started in Turkish policy after Turkey’s candidacy for the EU membership.

In this context, the objective of this study is to explain the convergences and divergences between Turkey and the EU in terms of both threats perceptions and policy preferences after 2000s. It is also argued that pace of ‘harmonization’ in security policies between the EU and Turkey has increased after the accession of Turkey as a candidate member at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. In addition, this paper presents the results of a survey, which illustrates the Turkish foreign and security policy elite’s security threat perceptions and policy preferences in 2007. The survey also provides data about the elite’s views on Turkish military expenditures and the EU-NATO relations.
1.2. Outline

This dissertation consists of five chapters. The introductory chapter describes the purpose and outline of the dissertation. It also includes the methodology, data and survey conducted for this study.

The second chapter briefly defines the concept of ‘security and threat perception’, and what determines them and makes them change. In addition, it explains the relation between threat perception and policy preferences.

The third chapter explains security threat perceptions and responses of the Turkish government, academic and public opinion and analyses size of the Turkish military force and its defence budget. Firstly, I introduce some general lines of Turkish foreign and security policy since the Republic’s establishment (1923). Then, I identify Turkey’s security threat perceptions and responses before and after 2000 to evaluate the changes in Turkish security policy after 2000. While, in general, there are no great differences in threat perceptions before and after 2000, however, there are significant changes in Turkish policy preferences after 2000. Turkish security policy has tended from unilateral, hard power and passive policy to combination of bilateral-multilateral, soft power and active policy.

There is no significant difference between the Turkish government and public opinion in terms of security threat perceptions. Public opinion, however, is quite different in terms of how to respond to the threats; while the government predominantly gives priority to bilateral-multilateral relations, soft power tools and cooperation with international institutions, the majority of the public believes that Turkey should pursue unilateral and hard power security policies. In addition, they consider that Turkey is not sufficiently supported by its allies, such as NATO and the EU. Although its defence budget has gradually decreased since 2000, Turkey is a country, which still
allocates a large share of the budget for its military expenditures, since its military force is seen as an important deterrent against the threats.

I also analyse the results of survey conducted for this dissertation in this chapter. The chapter provides empirical data about the Turkish elite’s threat perceptions and the responses to these threats in 2007, and their views on the Turkish military expenditure and EU-NATO relations. I attempt to find the answers to the following questions in the survey:

1- Which threats are perceived as the main threats by the Turkish elite in 2007?
2- What are the policy preferences of the Turkish elite in order to meet these threats?
3- How important is the EU at present to address the security threats facing Europe?
4- What do you the elite think about the Turkish military expenditures?
5- What are views of the Turkish elite on relationship between the EU-NATO and the USA?

According to the survey, the Turkish elite perceive, “terrorism, ethnic conflict, macroeconomic instability, criminalisation of the economy, natural disasters and pandemics” as the gravest risks facing Turkey in 2007. In order to respond to these threats, ‘diplomacy, economic-financial assistance and police cooperation-intelligence sharing’ are seen the main preferences by the elite. The elite believe that EU is very important particularly on providing “macroeconomic stability, narcotic trafficking, man-made environmental threats, criminalisation of economy, and migratory pressure” issues. Majority of the Turkish elite believe that the size of the Turkish defence budget is the appropriate size to meet the country’s security threats. On EU-NATO relations, half of the elite consider that a more autonomous ESDP would weaken NATO; majority of them believe that weaker NATO would have less responsibility on European security; and they generally believe in the American commitment to European Security. They believe that Turkish government conceives security as a both ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ and Turkey has predominantly pursued a combination of bilateral and multilateral approaches.
I compare security threat perceptions of the EU and Turkey, and their responses to the threats in the fourth chapter. The chapter also presents the EU and Turkey’s public opinion views on threat perceptions, and their military expenditures and development aid as indicators of their policy preferences. In general, the four large member states of the EU: France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, were taken into consideration when evaluating the security perceptions of the EU, since these member states are the most influential EU member states in terms of the EU foreign and security policies. Particularly, ‘the UK, France and Germany stand somewhat apart from the other EU members in terms of their economic resources and political influence as well as their military capabilities, including their troop numbers, their training and military hardware’ (Meyer, 2006:7). Besides, I briefly analyse the security relationship between the EU and Turkey since the establishment of the European Community. I address the following questions in this chapter:

1- What are the convergences and divergences between Turkey and the EU in terms of security threat perceptions and responses?

2- How do public opinions in the two societies views security policy?

3- What shares of their budgets do Turkey and the EU allocate military expenditure and development aid?

Turkey and the EU perceive “terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, and regional conflicts” as the main threats facing their societies. In general, both parties are converging in struggling against global threats; they have mainly pursued a multilateral approach by using soft power tools and there is close cooperation between Turkey and the EU in response to the threats. Nonetheless, in particular, Turkey’s preferences towards the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), Turkey and the EU are diverging in some respects. In addition, as the Eurobarometer (2007) and Transatlantic (2007) surveys show that Turkish society thinks quite differently to Europeans about how to respond to the threats. No European identity among the Turkish people, non-membership of Turkey, and the
stances of some EU’s member states regarding Turkey’s membership are some of the reasons for disparities between the Turkish people and Europeans. Last but not least, the financial resources devoted to military expenditures by Turkey are still much higher than EU military expenditures in terms of GDP, though Turkey’s defence budget has gradually decreased recently.

Finally, this study summarizes the security policies of Turkey and the EU in the last chapter. Although there are still security policy preference gaps between Turkey and the EU, I conclude that after 2000s, Turkey has begun to pursue a security policy close to that of the EU, and its security policy by and large converges with EU policy in terms of security threat perceptions and responses. Turkey has begun to give greater importance to bilateral and multilateral relations rather than unilateral relations. It has also begun to emphasize importance of soft power tools against threats facing Turkey. Furthermore, it has cooperated closely with the international organizations in dealing with threats and actively engages in several peacekeeping operations in various part of world.

1.3. Methodology and Data

Firstly, I articulate Turkey’s security threat perceptions and policy preferences before and after 2000 to analyse changes in its security policy (Chapter-3). Then, I make a comparison between threat perceptions and policy preferences of the EU and Turkey after 2000 era in order to explain convergences and divergences between two parts (Chapter-4).

I completely benefit from the secondary sources, Turkish government policies and statements -speeches of Turkish authorities (present Prime Minister, Defence Minister, and Generals), official documents, and opinions of prominent Turkish academics and security experts- to explain the changes in Turkish security policy. When I compare the security policies of the EU and Turkey, I again use secondary sources and official documents. I use the European Security Strategy (ESS) Document as a main source for explaining the security policy of the EU. The ESS
officially explains security policy of the EU; however, Turkey has no such document that explicitly describes its security strategy. Nevertheless, the ‘Turkish Defence Policy’ declared by the Turkish General Staff, the program of the present government, views of the present Defence Minister of Turkey, and the thoughts of prominent Turkish scholars have informed my account of the general security policy of Turkey.

The book called ‘Global Security Governance’, edited by Prof. Emil Kirchner and Prof. James Sperling is also a key source for this study. The book’s sixth chapter: ‘European Union: the European Security Strategy versus national preferences’ provides an analysis of threat perceptions and policy preferences of the EU. Thus, I could make comparison between threat perceptions and policy preferences of the EU and Turkey. Finally, recent surveys conducted by international polls such as ‘Eurobarometer’ and ‘Transatlantic Trends’ also contribute to the study. These surveys reflect the security threat perceptions and responses of public opinions of the EU and Turkey. Hence, they provide the basis for a comparison between views of Turkish people and Europeans on security subjects.

In addition, I conducted a survey in order to illustrate security threat perceptions and policy preferences of Turkish elite in 2007. However, it provides evidence only in order to analyse Turkish elite’s threat perceptions, policy preferences and opinions on Turkish defence budget and EU-NATO relations in 2007. I could not compare the Turkish elite’s threat perceptions and responses for different time period, since I was not able to find any data or research about what the security threat perceptions and policy preferences of the Turkish elite at past. It is very difficult to find same survey conducted in different times. I also could not use the survey in comparison security policy of the EU and Turkey, since I could not obtain same survey conducted for the European elites.
The survey consisting of 11 questions was distributed a sample comprised of people from various groups: security experts, academics, journalists, the members of Turkish parliament belonging to Foreign Policy and Defence Commission and civil servants related to security concept. In the respondent selection process, I sent my survey via e-mail to the respondents by explaining briefly outline and objective of my dissertation. The experts include the government officials in the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice and persons who focus on security issue in private think-tank organizations. I sent my survey the civil servants who are expert and related to security issues and working at the security department of the ministries. For the journalists, I sent my survey a list of columnists who write about on international relations issues -in particular on EU-Turkey relations- in the major Turkish newspaper. I did not discriminate either their political views or opinions on Turkey’s full membership for European Union. There are about 100 universities in Turkey. Due to time limitation, it would be difficult to conduct the survey with the all academics in Turkey. Thus, I chose academics; consist of assistant professor, associate professors and full professors, from the Department of International Relations of the major Turkish universities, which locate mostly in Ankara and Istanbul.

I did not care of views of respondents in selection process. Thus, the sample does not reflect the political views and party affiliation of respondents, and whether they are pro-Europeans or Euro-sceptics. However, both parliamentarians are member of ruling party, which is pro-EU. In addition, during the survey process (November 2007-January 2008), Turkish military cross-border operation against the PKK in Northern Iraq was on agenda. Hence, it is possible that respondents were affected by the agenda when they selected their security threat perceptions and policy preferences.
Table-1: A Response Rate by Category of Respondents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Number of sent questionnaire</th>
<th>Reply</th>
<th>Respondent rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants-Security Experts</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentarians</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>260</strong></td>
<td><strong>68</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questionnaire was conducted online in the period between November 2007 and January 2008, and sent to a sample of 260 people: 70 academics, 35 members of the Turkish parliament, 25 journalists, and 130 security experts and civil servants. Although approximately 100 respondents replied the survey, 68 persons completely replied the questionnaire: 16 academics, 6 journalists, 44 security experts and civil servants and 2 members of the Turkish parliament. Overall response rate is 26 per cent (68 persons out of 260).

The most obvious shortcomings of the survey are that the elite survey remained limited in terms of sample size (68 persons out of 260) and unbalanced distribution of sample (while 44 security experts and civil servants reply the survey, just 2 Turkish parliamentarians respond the questions). There are 35 parliamentarians in Foreign and Defence Committee in the Turkish Assembly, but just 2 of them replied the survey. Thus, 2 respondents are pretty low to represent all samples. In addition, due to time limitation, the survey conducted only by online. I was not able to have an opportunity neither to conduct the survey through face to face nor to interview with the Turkish elite, in particular, parliamentarians, officials from foreign and defence ministries, journalists, and experts working in think-tank organizations.


2. SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS

This chapter briefly explains the concept of ‘security’ and ‘threat perceptions’, what determines threat perceptions, what makes them change and how they are linked to the policy preferences.

Terriff et al (2001:1) explain ‘security’ as ‘being or feeling safe from harm or danger. Security is the safety of the state from attack, from the possibility of war, threats and military force’. Latham claims that ‘security is not an objective condition and threats are not simply objective or unmediated perceptions of danger; rather, what falls under the sign of security is pre-eminently a social and a cultural issue. Thus, threats must be understood as a particular set of historical discourses and practices that rest upon institutionalised shared understandings’ (Latham, 1999:138).

‘Threat perceptions arise from the anticipation of the intentional and hostile use of force against national citizens by state or non-state actors. Societies and their ruling elites can feel threatened in various ways; economically, culturally, politically, ideologically and militarily’ (Meyer, 2006:31).

Buzan (1991:19-20) highlights that the security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors; military, political, economic, societal and environmental:

“All military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of the welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within the acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security
concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. These five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematique, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkages”.

Buzan states that ‘a security threat depends on what type of threat it is, and how the recipient state perceives it. In addition, it depends on the intensity with which the threat operates’ (Buzan, 1991:134). The intensity of a threat determined by five variables: ‘the specificity of its identity, its nearness in space and time, the probability of its occurring, the weight of its consequences and whether or not perceptions of the threat are amplified by historical circumstances’ (Buzan, 1991:134).

‘Strategic norms, beliefs and values have also related to threat perceptions. They can be influenced and are often sustained by fear of others, which were traditionally conceived of as extra-territorial threats arising from members of other national communities’ (Meyer, 2006:32).

He argues that the cognitive process is shaped by four main factors:

“Firstly, threat perceptions might be quite independent of a potential enemy or the communication of an enemy threat, but are influenced by ‘lessons learned’ from past experiences. Secondly, threat perceptions are heavily influenced by perceptions of compatibility or incompatibility between a given political community and its potential antagonist in terms of its religious, political, cultural or ideological properties. Thirdly, they depend on the quality and the availability of information about threats. Finally, there is the assumption that political elites are always genuine about their communication of threats to their societies. They may have a particular interest in enemy image-building, to divert public attention or gain economic or political advantage” (Meyer, 2006:44-46).

Territoriality, which was a key characteristic of the Westphalian state, has lost most of its significance in the contemporary European state system. It changes the understanding of threats. In the past, most security threats such as military attack facing states came from other states. However, non-state actors, such as ethnic factionalism, migratory pressure, environmental issues, and narcotics are also threats to states and societies in the contemporary world. The interaction density in Europe (economic and political interdependence in Europe), political and economical openness, geographic propinquity, and cyberspace create new security threats in Europe. These altered the conception of security threats away from the narrow concern with national defence to a broader understanding and concern with security (Kirchner and Sperling, 2002:426-434). They identify twelve types of threats to the European security space:

“A biological/chemical attack; nuclear attack; the criminalization of economies; narcotics trafficking; ethnic conflict; macroeconomic destabilization; general environmental threats; general environmental threats; cyberwarfare or cybervandalism against commercial structures; cyberwarfare against defence structures; terrorism against state structure; and migratory pressures” (Kirchner and Sperling 2002:434).

Changes in threat perceptions have caused changes in policy preferences. Military power and unilateral approach were seen the main solution to meet external attacks in the past. They are still instruments in response to the threats. However, the emergence of new security threats has created new tools. New policy instruments such as economic and humanitarian aid, peacekeeping operations, diplomacy, police and intelligence cooperation among the states have developed to meet the contemporary threats. As the ESS highlights that ‘no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own’ (ESS:2), multilateral approach rather than unilateral has
been considered important to meet new threats. The complex, uncertain, dynamic and asymmetric security threats ‘outruns the capacities of states to respond unilaterally’ (Kirchner, 2007a:9).

In addition, Kirchner states that ‘history, geography, culture and limitations in capabilities are among the main reasons for the occurrence of different characteristics in the use of instruments (Kirchner, 2007a:16). For instance, Canada, Germany, Italy and Japan put the emphasis on conflict prevention, persuasion rather than use of force, and multilateral solution to security threats, the US seems to have adopted a policy of pre-emption, and to keep military means and unilateral solutions as policy preferences (Kirchner, 2007a:18).
3. SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSES OF TURKEY

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the security policy of Turkey. This involves looking at security threat perceptions, and the responses to those threats. In this section, I briefly outline the history of Turkish foreign policy from 1923 until the present. The next section summarizes the effects of the EU criteria on drastic changes in Turkish policy. The third section explains the Turkish threat perceptions and policy preferences before 2000. It will be helpful to explain the threats and responses to these threats before 2000 in order to understand changes Turkish policy preferences after 2000s. And following section analyses threat perceptions of the government, academics, and public opinion after 2000. While I rely on the secondary sources for the previous sections, I use both the secondary sources and results of the survey conducted by the author in this section. In the fifth section, I evaluate the policy preferences of Turkey after 2000 to the threats in terms of interaction (multi-, bi-, or unilateral); institutional (through the UN, EU, or NATO); and instrumental (hard versus soft power) preferences by utilizing secondary sources and survey results. In final section, I analyse the Turkish defence budget and the size of military forces by using secondary sources together with the survey results.

3.1. General Turkish Foreign Policy

Guided by the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Turkish Republic, Turkey has been pursuing a policy of ‘Peace at Home and Peace Abroad’ (Turkish MFA, 2007:1) since the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Because of the traumatic and painful effects and experiences of the First World War (1914-1918) and the War of Liberation (1919-1923), the Turkish elites did not want to enter another war. On the other hand peace situation was necessary for the reforms, which were done for new Republic. Atatürk said in his State of the Nation speech on November 1, 1928: ‘It is quite natural and therefore simple to explain the fact that a country
which is in the midst of fundamental reforms and development should sincerely desire peace and tranquillity both at home and in the world’ (cited in Criss & Bilgin, 1997:2).

There were two main foreign policy goals of the new Turkish state. First one is to create a strong and modern state, which could defend its territorial integrity and political independence. The second one is to bring Turkey to the level of contemporary civilizations, which was represented by Europe. Thus, ‘new political elites accepted the Western European community as the model’ (Altunisik & Tur, 2005:16).

In the interwar period, Turkey, aiming to ensure peace and stability in the region, initiated security cooperation both in the Balkans and the Middle East, such as ‘the Balkan Pact of 1934 with Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia, and the Sadabad Pact of 1937 with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan’ (Turkish MFA, 2007:3). ‘Turkish policy stand was essentially underlined by the simple principle of not assuming any involvement in power struggle unless all the alternative options were exhausted and legal requirements for such involvement were met’ (Okman, 2004:15). Thus, Turkey pursued neutral and non-alignment policies to secure its interests between the two wars era.

‘Although the alliances Britain and France put pressure on Turkey throughout the War, Turkey continued to pursue a neutrality policy in the War. Turkey had binding treaty commitments to Britain and France in 1939 but did not enter World War II until February 1945’ (Barchard, 1985:44).

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union’s claims on north-eastern Turkey and military bases on the Turkish straits in the immediate aftermath of World War II were the major threats to Turkey's sovereignty. The expansionist policies of the Soviet Union and communist threat pushed Turkey toward alliance with the West. Support of the United States of America (USA) and membership in NATO were instrumental preferences of Turkey in deterring the Soviet Union’s aggressive
intentions (Makovsky & Sayari, 2000:1). In the 1950s, Turkey was the ‘south-eastern bulwark of NATO’ (Kramer, 2000:232); it took an active role in Western efforts to prevent Soviet influence from expanding into the Middle East and Mediterranean, contributed troops to the struggle in Korean War and promoted cooperation by initiating establishment of the ‘pro-Western Baghdad Pact and the Central Treaty Organization’ (Kirisci, 2000:39).

The US presence in Turkey increased significantly after the membership of NATO in 1952; ‘the US established electronic monitoring sites, based reconnaissance aircraft, and later deployed intermediate-range ballistic missiles and tactical strike aircraft in Turkey’ (Altunisik & Tur, 2005:105). However, due to the Cuba missile crisis\(^1\) between the USA and Soviet Union in 1962, President Johnson’s letter\(^2\) in 1964, and the Cyprus crisis\(^3\) in 1974, Turkish elites gradually perceived that they needed a multilateral foreign policy and had to re-evaluate its security policy and diversify it instead of depending entirely on Washington. The government started a policy of ‘middle path between reliance on the USA and Europe’ (Ahmad, 2004:32-33) and followed a policy of the ‘use of the world power balance for defence of the full independence and territorial integrity of Turkey’ (Mango, 2000:10).

‘During the long Cold War era, the Soviet threat, how to protect Turkish interest’s vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus, and how to maintain and strengthen ties with the USA, NATO and the European Community were the main issues of Turkish foreign policy’ (Makovsky & Sayari, 2000:1). Nevertheless, in this era, its regional environment was far more stable than it is today. ‘The Caucasus and Central Asia were firmly under the control of the Soviet Union. There was stability in the Balkans where there were mostly socialist countries. The Middle East was not

\(^1\) ‘In Cuba missile crisis, President Kennedy agreed with the Soviet president Khrushchev to remove missiles from Turkey in exchange for the removal of missiles from Cuba’ (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003:163).
\(^2\) ‘Johnson, in his letter, warned Turkish prime minister that Turkey could use US equipments in an operation in Cyprus Island and if Turkish intervention in island were to invite a Soviet Union attack, NATO was not obliged to defend Turkey’ (Altunisik & Tur, 2005:105).
\(^3\) In Cyprus issue, the USA imposed on arms embargo in the wake of the 1974 Cyprus conflict (Altunisik & Tur, 2005:107).
stable due to Iran-Iraq war and Arab-Israeli conflicts. However, because of the effects of Cold War other problems were frozen in Middle East as well. End of Cold War has caused to flourish new conflicts in the immediate region of Turkey’ (Bagci & Bal, 2002:5).

3.2. The Impact of Europeanization on Turkish Policy

Featherstone and Kazamias define the term “Europeanization” to cover how states are involved in and adaptation to (West) European norms and practices’ (cited in Winrow, 2005:4). It implies increasing convergence, and is often taken to mean the imposition of particular policies, political structures or social identities on member states and their societies (Diez et al, 2005:2).

The EU has gradually evolved with the aim of economic, political and monetary union as well as asserting a European identity after the Maastricht Treaty. It has focused on the common values and political objectives of Europeans (Arikan, 2006:32). At the Copenhagen summit in June 1993, the EU introduced economic and political conditions called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for membership. It established the ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ as the sine qua non political condition of EU accession (Schimmelfennig et al, 2003:497).

The EU has two main aims through the Copenhagen criteria: ‘comprehensive and strict conditions for EU membership and a pre-accession strategy for candidate countries which is designed to help and direct to these countries to satisfy the stated conditions for EU membership before the accession negotiations starts’ (Arikan, 2006:43).

Democratic conditionality’ is the core strategy of the EU and it targets to induce candidate states to comply with its human rights and democracy standards (Schimmelfennig et al, 2003:495), and to stabilize democracy and consolidate the process of further democratization for the candidate states (Diez et al, 2005:2).
When the EU declared Turkey ‘candidate status’ at the Helsinki summit of 1999, it has stressed that ‘the screening process would be opened and that membership negotiations would begin as soon as the country fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria’ (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003:507-508).

In this context, Turkey’s relations with the EU have been reinvigorated in the aftermath of the Helsinki decision on Turkey’s accession as a candidate country, and the drastic changes in Turkey’s political constitution has experienced (Diez et al., 2005:1). Constitutional reform packages ‘including the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime and cultural rights for the Kurdish minority -the teaching of Kurdish in education and its use in broadcasting-’ (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003:508), and ‘restrict the power of the military’ (Kubicek, 2005:2) were adopted by Parliament to meet the Copenhagen criteria.

In 2000, the government declared a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis designed to help meet the criteria. This program proposed 89 new laws and 94 amendments to existing laws. Considerable reforms would occur, as by the end of 2004, nine reform or “harmonization” packages made their way through the Turkish National Assembly. Three of these would be under the left-right coalition government (2000-2002) and six under the AKP (the Justice and Development Party) government, elected in November 2002 (Kubicek, 2005:11-12).

Meltem Muftuler Bac claims that ‘the adoption of successive reform packages by the Turkish National Assembly to meet the Copenhagen criteria has placed the EU at the forefront of the democratization agenda in Turkey’ (cited in Diez et al., 2005:7). In addition, Tocci states that ‘the EU is an important anchor for the process of change’ (cited in Diez et al., 2005:11), and analysts argue that ‘the political Europeanization process in Turkey really got underway after the Helsinki decision’ (Diez et al., 2005:11).

On the other hand, the EU has stressed the importance of the resolution of bilateral issues with neighbour countries including minority and border problems between the acceding members
(Arikan, 2006:34). Although these issues are not included in the Copenhagen criteria, for instance, ‘the EU’s Accession Partnership Document (APD) has included the resolution of the Cyprus issue among the medium term objectives that Turkey must meet’ (McLaren & Muftuler-Bac, 2005:195). This means that candidate countries should solve their security issues and not transfer any security issues into the EU. The EU aims to ensure a stable Europe and to prevent likely conflicts between the member states through this condition.

In conclusion, after the Helsinki decision on Turkey’s accession as a candidate country, in a process of Europeanization, the Turkish governments believe that Turkey has to solve its foreign and domestic security challenges for EU’s full membership. They also consider that Turkey has to pursue similar policy preferences with the EU in order to accelerate membership process.

3.3. Security Threat Perceptions and Responses before 2000

Turkey focused on instabilities in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East and the PKK activities during the 1990s. It had several problems with its neighbours. In this term, Turkey pursued predominantly unilateral and hard power tools as the responses to the threats.

3.3.1 Security Threat Perceptions

The Soviet Union/Communist threat was the most significant threat facing Turkey during the Cold War period. The end of the Cold War caused the end of the Soviet Union/Communist threat against Turkey. Nevertheless, ‘power vacuum and geopolitical vulnerability’ (Bagci & Bal, 2002:5) have caused instabilities and conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East in 1990s. All these regions, which are both immediate neighbours of Turkey and highly related to its interest and security, are the unstable regions of the world. Turkey has political, religious and cultural connections with the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East. Thus, Turkey has faced security threats emanating from these regions after the end of the Soviet Union threat.
A large number of problems, which are directly or indirectly related to Turkey, have occurred in these regions. These are the Gulf War in Iraq, Bosnia War in the Balkans, conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh, disputes between Turkey-Armenia, the Aphasia and Osethia problems in Georgia, the Chechen problem in Russia, disputes regarding Aegean Sea and Cyprus between Turkey and Greece, the Palestine problem, conflicts in Kosovo, disputes regarding water issue and Hatay province between Turkey and Syria.

The PKK was being perceived as one of the gravest threats to Turkey in this term. It emerged in 1980s, developed significantly at the beginning of 1990s, and killed ten thousands of Turkish solders and civilians. Its activities increased after the Gulf War in the 1990s due to the ‘power vacuum’ (Gozen, 2004:48) emerged in the north of Iraq where the Kurdish separatist groups were planning the established a Kurdish state by curving lands from Iraq, Turkey and Iran. It based in the border southeast of Turkey and northern Iraq, launched terror attacks against Turkish military forces as well as civilians in Turkey.

Turkey is a secular republic, thus, religious extremism –political religious movements- is perceived as a leading security challenges for the country by the elites, particularly the military and secular elites. Historically, the armed forces have occupied a privileged position both in the Ottoman period and in the Turkish Republic. ‘The Turkish military has acted as guardian of the Turkish secular state, seeing its mission as not only to defend the territorial integrity of Turkey against external threats but also to protect it against internal security challenges, such as the Kurdish separatism and religious extremism’ (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003:27). The Welfare Party, which was a ruling party, was removed from the government and banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court after the heavy pressure by the Turkish secular elite.
3.3.2 Responses to Threats

Defence policy of Turkey is designed to preserve and protect the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and vital interests of the country. It’s foreign and security policy did depend on the nature of issues until the end of the 1990s. ‘If an issue was highly related to national interest, Turkey's security policy behaviour would tend to be more unilateral and uncompromising. Otherwise, its security policy would tend to be more multilateral, compromising and international’ (Criss, 1995:203).

Traditionally, known as a ‘status quo power’ (Kirisci, 2006:49) Turkey was pursuing a policy of unilateral rather than multilateral approach in security policies. Turkey’s policies towards its neighbours (Greece, Syria and Armenia) were generally called uncompromising policy; particularly regarding Cyprus issue, Turkey was known as main obstacle in solution process. On Cyprus issue, Turkey had an uncompromising policy and vetoed several UN’s plans. Its foreign policy was generally known a policy of no comprise. Besides, Turkey launched unilaterally several military operations as a response to the PKK in northern Iraq.

Nonetheless, Turkey pursued multilateral diplomacy and bilateral ties in the Bosnia and Kosovo crises. Although there were domestic pressures to intervene in the war between Serbs and Bosnians⁴, the government did not pursue unilateralist policies and called international community instead of unilateral intervention. It used the international organizations, such as NATO and UN to conclude the crises in the Balkans and developed its bilateral relations with all the Balkan countries except Serbia, in the political, military and economic fields.

Turkey developed close relations with the ex-Soviet Union states after the end of the Cold War. It promoted economic, educational, social and political relations in the region to ensure and maintain peace and stability in the region. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization,

⁴ There are many Bosnian origin Turkish citizens who are politicians, businessmen, and academics in Turkey.
the Blackseafor\textsuperscript{5} and Black Sea Harmony\textsuperscript{6} are the examples of regional economic and political cooperation.

Using hard power policy such as threaten by military force was the main characteristic of Turkish security policy until the end of 1990s. Turkey would nearly fight with Greece over an island in the Aegean Sea in 1996. As the EU decided to start Greek Cyprus’s accession process and excluded Turkey from the list of candidate states for membership in 1997, Turkey threatened that further integration with the Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Turkey threatened Syria with military force in 1998, if it would continue to support PKK. In addition, it threatened both Greek Cyprus and Greece, if S-300 missiles would be deployed on the Greek Cyprus. The Turkish Military Forces has carried out several cross-border military operations against the PKK camps located in northern Iraq during the 1990s.

Table-2: Security threat perceptions and policy preferences of Turkey before 2000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Perceptions</th>
<th>Soviet Union/Communism (until 1990s), terrorism (PKK), regional conflicts, religious extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Preferences</td>
<td>Predominantly unilateral, partly bilateral and multilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Preferences</td>
<td>NATO (particularly in Cold War era), UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental Preferences</td>
<td>Primarily military power, cross-border operations, peace-keeping operations (in Balkans)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{5} ‘The objective of Blackseafor is to render this force fully operational in combating asymmetrical threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction’ (Akcapar, 2007: 92).

\textsuperscript{6} ‘The objective of Black Sea Harmony is to conduct maritime surveillance operations against suspect vessel in the Black Sea. Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia joined this cooperation’ (Akcapar, 2007: 93).
3.4. Security Threat Perceptions and Responses after 2000

Iraq invasion by the US in 2003, instabilities and conflicts in Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, rise in PKK’s activities particularly after 2004, Iran’s nuclear program, disputes between the US and Iran, and organized crime have been perceived main threats to Turkey after 2000. In addition, new world security order replaced to the Cold War order has extremely affected security position of Turkey because of its ‘critical geographical location astride the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus’ (Winrow, 2000:116).

3.4.1. Government Perceptions

Turkish policymakers mainly highlight that Turkey is facing several security threats because of the geographic position of the country. The Turkish Defence Minister explains the features of new threats and counts main threats facing Turkey in his speeches:

“Turkey is located at the centre of unstable region where there are many unknown, multidimensional and unlimited asymmetric threats and risks, which affect national and international securities. In this context, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crimes, illegal migration, drug and weapon trafficking, extremists and ethnic nationalism are the main threats and risks for Turkey’s security” (Defence Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2004:1).

Turkish military authorities also explain similar threats as main risks for the country. According to Turkey’s Defence Policy declared by Turkish General Staff, Turkey’s basic security concerns are focused on; ‘terrorism, the threat of Long-Range Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction, religious extremism, and regional conflicts’ (Turkey’s Defence Policy, 2007).

7 National Security Council of Turkey defines asymmetric threat as ‘a kind of threat perception, which causes instabilities in economic, social and political systems of states since it catches the states in unexpected and unprepared positions’. Terrorism, regional instabilities, separatist micro and ethnic nationalism, fundamentalism, organized crime, drug and human trafficking, mass migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means and cyber-terror are example of asymmetric threats (Turkish MFA, 2007).
Although PKK’s activities decrease after the capture of its leader in 1999, it has been still perceived as one of the gravest threats facing Turkey by the government, due to increase its terror and political activities after 2004. ‘The PKK in June 2004 started to mount terrorist attacks, and these increased significantly especially during the course of the summer 2005’ (Kirisci, 2006:95). Iraq invasion by the USA in 2003 has caused the authority vacuum in northern Iraq, and ‘greatly internationalised the Kurdish issue and led to the existence of a de facto state of Kurdistan in northern Iraq’ (Gunter, 2006:96). Thus, ‘the government has been anxious about the possible political and security implications of the US intervention in Iraq and fears and suspects that the current unstable situation in Iraq could lead to the emergence of an independent Kurdish state and to the re-emergence of a threat to Turkish national security’ (Kirisci, 2004:290-313). In addition, Turkey has been targeted the international terrorism; ‘terrorists attacked Istanbul in 2003 and several people dead and injured in this bomb attacks’ (BBC News, 20 November 2003).

Disagreements with its immediate neighbours and regional conflicts around Turkey are perceived other threats by the government. In this context, Turkish government is sensitive on the Cyprus and Aegean issues, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the acquisitions of nuclear weapons of Iran, insecurity in Iraq and likely conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

Turkish-Greek relations have significantly improved political and economical after the huge earthquake in Turkey of 1999. The prime ministries of two countries exchanged goodwill visits. ‘Although, warming trend has begun and relationship between Turkey and Greece have improved significantly since the end of 1990s, this détente has been limited to relatively non-controversial issues and the main disputes over the Aegean and Cyprus have not been resolved’ (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003:64).
Cyprus problem is other issue of high priority for Turkey, which considers the island as a ‘cornerstone of security for Turkey’s southern rim and a key element in the defence of southern Anatolia’ (Kramer, 2000:175). Although solution process starts after the approval the UN’s plan by the Turkish Cypriots in 2004, the Cyprus is still a security issue for Turkey at international level.

Disagreement with Armenia has continued after 2000. ‘Armenia’s allegation of Armenian Genocide and closeness of border with Armenia have constituted major challenges to Turkey’ (Kirisci, 2006:8).

Iran nuclear program has been seen another threats for Turkish state. The government officials do consider the acquisitions of nuclear weapons as a threat the regional stability and highlight that ‘if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, Turkey would be doomed to an asymmetric relationship with Iran’ (Kirisci, 2006:73). General Ilker Basbug stresses, “Turkey can never welcome an Iran who possesses nuclear weapons. The nuclear states axis starting from North Korea, passing through Iran and extending to other possible powers in our region poses sensitivity on part of Turkey. Turkey’s policy is to see the Middle East as a nuclear weapon free zone” (Basbug, 2005:4-5).

In addition to Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear capability, ‘Iran and Syria possess ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and Turkey’s important population centres, dams, power stations, air bases, and military headquarters are within the range of these missile systems. The threat became quite real during the October 1988 crisis over Syria’s harbouring of PKK leader Ocalan’ (Kirisci, 2000:43).

The Turkish decision-makers consider how to manage relations with the USA that may seek a unilateral military intervention against Iran. It fears the economic and political consequences of both sanctions as well as a possible military intervention of a unilateral or even multilateral
nature. Kirisci stated that ‘Turkey is in a major dilemma. On the one hand, a nuclear Iran is clearly a threat and a source of instability in the region. On the other hand, the imposition of sanctions on Iran, let alone military intervention, would adversely affect Turkey economic and political interests’ (Kirisci, 2006:74-77).

Due to the waves of immigration lasting long years (between 1923-1960 years), a considerable part of Turkey’s population has links to the Balkans. These links became an important reason for Turkey’s interest in the region in the post-Cold War period. In addition, geographically, the Balkans constitutes a strategic link between Turkey and Western Europe. Finally, Turkey has an interest in the stability of the region since any instability has likely a spill over effect on Turkey. Turkey also has religious and ethnic ties with most of the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Stability in the Caucasus obviously would be in Turkey’s interest, particularly since it would facilitate constructional of regional oil and gas pipelines. The outbreak of ethnic conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya and Georgia has negative effects on Turkey. In addition, Ankara was also sensitive to these conflicts because of the large numbers of citizens of Turkey with ethnic ties to the region (Altunisik & Tur, 2005:127-130).

Turkey and Russia have been sought rivals in the Caucasus and Central Asia. ‘They were on opposing sides in the Balkans in terms of their policies towards the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo and traditionally Russia supports the Greek Cypriot in the Cyprus issue. In addition, while Turkey accused Russia of supporting the PKK, Russia claimed Turkey’s interference in the Chechen conflict’ (Altunisik & Tur, 2005:130-131). Despite these problems and divergent perspectives, however, Turkey and Russia have established a relationship based on trade cooperation, such as Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) since the mid-1990s.

Besides these more traditional ‘high politics’ security threats, Turkey has been faced with a new set of ‘low politics’ threats recently. Problems of energy supply (Turkey depends on mainly
foreign energy especially in terms of oil and natural gas sources), drastic rise in organised crimes, illegal migration and internal migration (from east part to west part and major cities of Turkey), human and drug trafficking (Turkey is a transit country from Asia to Europe in terms of human and drug trafficking), illegal arms trade, to money laundering, environmental issues are also seen as part of the security threats facing Turkey. Besides, it could be said that natural disasters especially earthquake\(^8\) and pandemics such as bird flu are other threats for Turkey. Turkey has experienced many earthquakes since it is located on seismic belt. It lost thousand of people in recent earthquake in 1999, and it is usually argued by geologists that it is expected a deep earthquake in next future in Turkey especially in Istanbul. Turkey has also faced avian bird flu cases recently.

### 3.4.2. Academic Views

Professor Suhnaz Yilmaz, categorizes Turkey’s threat perceptions under three groups:

a) High Priority Issues for Turkey vital for its Strategic Interests: Future of Iraq, Cyprus issue and Aegean problems.

b) Issues of medium-term interest with broader regional and global implications: International terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region and Arab-Israeli conflict.


She also emphasizes the main security threats to Turkey:

“The developments in Iraq, the Cyprus problem and the long lasting tensions in the Aegean (disputes such as territorial waters, continental shelf, airspace, and militarization of the eastern Greek islands) with Greece, and the Iranian attempts towards acquiring nuclear technology to develop weapons of mass destruction are the vital security concerns of Turkey.” (Yilmaz, 2006:54).

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\(^8\) Turkey is plagued by earthquakes - generally minor - because of its location on the North Anatolian fault line.
Another academic Ramazan Gozen categorizes the challenges to Turkey’s security into four groups (Gozen, 2003:14-15):

a) Challenges to Turkey’s security policy have been multidirectional. In the new era Turkey’s security perspective is influenced by developments from all directions: the Middle East and the Mediterranean in the south, the Caucasus and Central Asia in the east, the Balkans in the west and the Russian factor in the north.

b) Turkey’s security agenda has been multifunctional; the soft security issues, such as terrorism, ethnic nationalism, social and economic instabilities, refugees, weapons of mass destruction etc. occupy Turkey’s security agenda more than ever before.

c) Turkey’s security agenda has been multileveled, which means that Turkey’s security concerns come from various levels, such as the international system, interstate, domestic/national and individual levels.

d) Turkey’s security has been challenged by multi-institutionalisation of the international security architecture in Europe. While during the Cold War years, NATO was the only security framework for protecting Turkey’s security, in the new era; NATO, OSCE, WEU and EU are the main security institutions for Turkey security interests.

Related to the Middle East, Gozen (2004:27) claims that invasion of Iraq and the ensuing power vacuum in Iraq had a very negative impact on Turkish foreign policy. To him, Iraq has continued to be a source of security concern for Turkey for three reasons:

“Firstly, the PKK established camps in northern Iraq from where launched attacks to Turkey. Turkey launched a number of military operations in northern Iraq to strike PKK camps. The terror activities caused 40,000 people killed and hundreds of thousand injured and billions of dollars spent for fighting against the PKK terror. Secondly, de facto, fragmentation of Iraq into parts concerned Turkey due to
possibility of establishment of a Kurdish state in the region. Turkey opposed to such a development due to its potential threat to Turkey’s territorial, social and political integration. Finally, Turkey also suffered economically Iraq war since it suspended its economic and commercial relations with Iraq, which was one of the Turkey’s best foreign economic partners in the 1980s” (Gozen, 2004:36-37).

The Turkish scholars explain that there are many reasons of security threats against Turkey. According to the former foreign minister and academic Mumtaz Soysal:

“Hostile views have come from countries history bears the scars of some old or recent conflict with the Ottoman Empire or the Republic of Turkey. This negative feeling is likely to produce a concrete and direct effect on its relations with its neighbours, such as Greece, Syria and Armenia. Turkey is surrounded by nations that attained independence from the Ottoman relatively recently” (2004:40). He also claims that ‘there is one legacy of history that will remain as a determinant factor of future Turkish foreign policy: the collective Turkish feeling that can be called the Sevres Syndrome9’ (Soysal, 2004:41).

The security analyst and retired general Erguvenc asserts the similar opinion:

“Turkey is almost completely surrounded by present and potential instabilities and irredentism. This is mainly due to the somewhat painful and unhealthy dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The modern Turkish Republic could not escape this inheritance. Many of the old Ottoman provinces have turned into neighbouring states. While this event made Turkey realise the need for its own national defence planning, it did not change Turkey’s basic security orientation, but certainly broadened its security perceptions” (Erguvenc, 1998:1).

To security expert Eroglu, because of its geo-strategic importance, ‘Turkey’s territory is constantly attractive for west and east civilizations. Anatolia is target of all the great powers all

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9 The treaty of Sevres, signed in 1920, between the victors of the I World War and Ottoman Empire, stipulated the dismemberment of the imperial territories outside Anatolia and the establishment of various occupation zones on present day Turkish territory, plus the creation of an independent Armenia in the east and the organization of a referendum for an independent Kurdistan in the southeast. However the Treaty never came into force (Soysal, 2004:41). ‘It is a popular concept among the nationalists, as well as the bureaucratic and military circles. It is based on the belief in a conspiracy and embodies the fear that the Treaty of Sevres will be revived’ (Kirisci, 2004:290).
the time. Therefore, the nations who live on Anatolia are faced with threats of other nations’ (Eroglu, 2006:1).

In conclusion, Turkey, which is at the centre of the three unstable regions, has faced several security threats due to its geo-strategic position and historical reasons.

-Turkish Elite Threat Perceptions:

This section presents the results of a survey on the Turkish foreign policy elite’s perception of new security threats. According to the survey, the main threats facing Turkey in 2007 are accordingly, ‘terrorist attacks against state and society’, ‘ethnic conflict’, ‘criminalisation of the economy’, ‘macroeconomic instability’ and ‘natural disasters and pandemics’.

The first question concerned the identification of the main threats posed to Turkey in 2007. The respondents were asked to indicate the main five security threats facing the country. Having analysed the data, it emerges that the main five threats for the Turkish elite in 2007 are, in decreasing order: terrorist attacks against the state and society (56 responses), macroeconomic instability (52 responses), the criminalisation of the economy (46 responses), ethnic conflict (41 responses) and natural disasters and pandemics (41 responses) (Figure-1). According to the survey, ‘terrorist attacks against the state and society’ is also the first rank among the five gravest threats. 32 respondents believe that ‘terrorist attacks against the state and society’ is the first gravest threat facing Turkey in 2007. In addition, 10 respondents believe that the ‘criminalisation of the economy’, and ‘ethnic conflict’ are the first gravest threats to Turkey; 5 respondents consider that ‘macroeconomic instability’ is the most significant risks in 2007.

The survey results mainly support the government statements and academic views on threat perceptions facing the country today. ‘Terrorist attacks against the state and society’ and ‘ethnic conflict’ are perceived as the PKK activities and likely domestic conflict between Turks and
Kurds in Turkey by the elite. Thus, the PKK is perceived as the gravest threat facing Turkey in 2007 by the elite.

Like the government, the elite consider that ‘natural disasters and pandemics’ are also significant issues facing Turkey in 2007. After the huge and destructive earthquake in and around Istanbul in 1999,\(^\text{10}\) there is a general expectation that another huge earthquake can hit Istanbul. Turkey is on a very active seismic belt, thus, there has been occurred different magnitude of earthquakes in several parts of Turkey, and scientists usually claim that a destructive earthquake is very likely in the near future, particularly in Istanbul. In addition, avian bird flu has been seen in various part of Turkey for three years, and several people died due to bird flu.

Furthermore, economy has been a real problem for a long time in Turkey. Turkey experienced the most serious economic crises in 2001. Several major banks and firms went bankrupt, and a hundred thousands of people were out of work in this crisis. Although Turkey has improved significantly in terms of economy recently, due to the great effect of past crises and vulnerability of the Turkish economy, the elite consider that ‘macroeconomic instability’ and ‘criminalisation of the economy’ can be threats facing Turkey today.

On the other hand, ‘migratory pressure, conventional war, biological/chemical attack, cyber attack, and nuclear attack’ are perceived fewer threats by the elite in 2007. The elite do not consider that these threats are immediate risks to Turkey. The survey do not support that ‘proliferation of nuclear weapons’ is a gravest threat facing the country. While the government and Turkish academics perceive ‘proliferation of nuclear weapons’ (Iran nuclear power acquisition) as a great threat, the survey results show that the Turkish elite does not consider ‘nuclear attack’ as a major threat. In addition, migration has been perceived as a threat by the government; however, the elite believe that it is less important threat.

\(^{10}\) Ten thousands people died in this earthquake.
In summary, although there are few gaps, the survey shows that the Turkish elite opinion is consistent with the government and academics in terms of security threat perceptions.

**Figure-1: Security Threat Perceptions of Turkish elite in 2007.**

Source: Appendix, Question 1. (68 people responded to the survey and each selected five threats from the list).
Table-3: Security threat perceptions of the Turkish elites in 2007:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat event</th>
<th>2007 (respondent)</th>
<th>2007 (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist attacks against State or Society</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic Instability</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminalisation of the Economy</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethic Conflict</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural disasters and pandemics</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcotics Trafficking</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man-made Environmental Threats</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migratory Pressures</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional War</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological/Chemical Attack</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Attack</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix, Question 1.
3.4.3. Public Opinion Perceptions

Turkey is a democratic country, thus the choices of the Turkish public are highly important for the political parties and policymakers. The public opinion has a great impact on the governments in shaping foreign and domestic policies. It is also legitimising force about Turkey’s foreign and security policies, and policy preferences. In addition, it is needed to learn the Turkish public opinion’s security threat perceptions and policy preferences in order to make comparison with those of the Turkish elite.

When security threats are mentioned, the Turks predominantly perceive domestic issues rather than foreign issues. Therefore, economic problems, such as unemployment, inflation and economic crisis, and the PKK have been seen the gravest threats by the people.

Table-4 demonstrates results of a public opinion poll, conducted in between 2005 and 2007 by Eurobarometer, on perceived security threats; 62 per cent of respondents are concerned about ‘unemployment’, 50 per cent about ‘terrorism’, and 28 per cent about ‘economic situation’ in 2007. It also shows that according to the public opinion, ‘unemployment’ is the most serious issue for Turkey. Turkey experienced the most serious economic crises in its history in 2001. However, people have attempted to escape the effects of this crisis recently after the successful economic program implemented by the ruling government. Table-4 shows that it decreased from 72 per cent in 2005, to 62 per cent in 2007. On the other hand, terrorism was the third most important threat (29 per cent) in 2005, whereas it is the second most serious threat (50 per cent) in 2007. That is due to drastically increase in the number of the PKK attacks and activities against the Turkish army and population in 2007.
Table-4: Turkish threat perceptions in 2005-2007:

Question 1: What do you think are the two most important issues facing in your country at the moment? (max. two answers) (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Situation</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Educational System</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Healthcare System</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence/Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/No Answer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer polls between 2005-2007 (Eurobarometer 63.4, 65, and 67).

Furthermore, the opinion of Turkish people related to international security threats are basically reflected in the Transatlantic Trends survey. According to the survey conducted in 2007, the Turkish people perceived ‘the effect of global warming’, ‘a major economic downtown’, and ‘international terrorism’ as the most important threats, respectively, facing the country in the next ten years (Table-5). While 67 per cent perceived the global warming as a threat in 2005, 84 per cent of people perceived it as a threat in 2007. The people perceive the effect of global warming as a serious threat, since drought has been experienced in many parts of Turkey recently. Especially, residents of Istanbul and Ankara experienced water shortage due to global warming in 2007.

According to the same survey, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘large number of immigrants and refuges into Europe’ are seen fewer threats by the public. It could be claimed that since Turkey is
a Muslim country, they do not perceived themselves or their coreligionists as a threat. Regarding migration problem, it could be said that Turkish society assesses the ‘large number of immigrants and refuges into Europe’ as a problem of the EU rather than Turkey. That is why it is perceived as a less threat for Turkey.

**Table-5:** Turkish global security threat perceptions in 2007:

Question 1: in the next 10 years, please tell me how likely you are to be personally affected by each of the following threats (per cent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Not Likely</th>
<th>DK/Refusal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Terrorism</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large numbers of immigrants/refugees to Europe</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran acquiring nuclear weapons</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The global spread of a disease as avian flu</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy dependence</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A major economic downtown</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The effect of global warming</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic fundamentalism</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: German Marshall Fund of the USA, Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2007.

In conclusion, Turkish public opinion is much more sensitive about economic issues and terrorism. The public threat perceptions are mainly converging threat perceptions of the elite. ‘Terrorism and economic problems’ are perceived both the Turkish elite and people. There are several reasons why public are basically concerned about economic issues and terrorism. First, economic issues, such as unemployment, inflation, and a major economic crisis extensively and directly affect people’s daily livelihood and quality of life. Second, Turkey, as a developing country, has still fragile economy, although it has an extraordinary economic growth after experiencing its greatest economic crisis in 2001. On the other hand, the people are sensitive on terrorism, since the Turkish people have suffered many victims because of the PKK activities.
Majority of the Turkish families have lost their own or their relatives’ children in the fight against terrorism for 25 years.

3.5. Responses to Threats

Scholars argue that Turkish foreign policy has been undergoing a major change in recent years. For instance, Martin assesses that, ‘by the end of the twentieth century, Turkey has begun to pursue a proactive policy by leaving its previous neutral policy to challenge its multidimensional security threats that it faces in the region’ (Martin, 2004:161). Turkey's new foreign policy is based on an approach of ‘zero-problems with neighbours’ (Kirisci, 2006:51). As a result of this policy, Turkey has started reconciling process with its neighbour countries, such as Syria, Greece, Russia and Iran. It has actively played a significant role in reshaping new security policy in the region. It has engaged as a mediator between Israeli-Palestine\textsuperscript{11}, Pakistan-Afghanistan\textsuperscript{12} and Israeli-Pakistan\textsuperscript{13}.

Academic Kut explains the new characteristics of Turkish policy in three categories: ‘an active involvement in international problems, a pro-interventionist stance against aggression, and extensive use of multilateral diplomacy’ (Kut, 2000:82).

Its candidacy for the EU membership is a significant factor that causes changes in Turkish policy. The –present- pro-European government believe that for the EU full membership, Turkey has to solve its security problems such as Cyprus and Kurdish issues and to converge its security policy with the EU’s policy. In addition, they believe that good relations and compromising policy with the neighbour countries, to participate peacekeeping operations, to contribute stability and peace

\textsuperscript{11} Turkey ‘hosted a historic meeting between Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas on 13 November 2007’ (Today’s Zaman, 14 November 2007).
\textsuperscript{12} Turkey also hosted a summit meeting with ‘the Presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan on 29-30 April 2007’ (Turkish MFA, 2007:29).
\textsuperscript{13} It ensured a meeting in Istanbul on 1 September 2005 between the Foreign Ministers of Israel and Pakistan (Turkish MFA, 2007:16).
in the region, and cooperation with the international organizations would have positive effects on its full membership for the EU.

3.5.1. Interaction Preferences

Despite the remaining suspicion among some Turkish political and intellectual -particularly nationalist- elites, Turkey has begun to follow a proactive and constructive foreign policy and multidimensional diplomacy since 2000. It all promotes a multilateral approach in dealing with regional conflicts. In Iraq issue, Turkey followed a multilateralist perspective with the EU and did not support unilateralist approach of the US, thus, it did not allow to the US army to invasion of Iraq by using Turkish border. In the Balkan crises, Turkey called UN and NATO to prevent conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. Related to Israel-Palestine conflict, it has played a mediator role and the Turkish government ensured a negotiation between the presidents of Israel and Palestine in Turkey. It has also followed an active diplomacy, aiming to chart a new and benign course for bilateral, neighbourly relations with Greece and Syria. For instance, although all problems between Turkey and Greece are not still resolved, the relationship changed dramatically after 1999. Turkish and Greek governments built a peace situation and recognized that friendly relations could achieve greater security and prosperity benefits for both sides. Turkey and Greece have been a close relationship in cultural and economic cooperation, and combated mutually against organized crimes, such as drug and human trafficking after the starting of rapprochement process. Nevertheless, regarding the PKK issue, Turkey has predominantly pursued unilateral policy and has performed several military cross-border operations in northern Iraq.

It is believed that this active diplomacy policy would not only protect Turkey’s interests but also contribute to solve regional problems. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that ‘Turkey does not confine itself in this project in a strict sense to the framework of national interest alone, but rather pursues a pro-active foreign policy aimed at contributing to regional and
global peace and security, and encourages as well as activates regional cooperation initiatives’ (cited in Akcapar, 2007:82).

Prominent Turkish scholar Kirisci (2006:49-51) also accepts the significant changing in Turkish foreign and security policy and explains the reasons in three groups:

“Firstly the AKP government has been keener to be ‘daring’ in addressing and attempting to resolve entrenched bilateral conflicts. In developing a new policy on Cyprus, the government demonstrated its ability to overcome massive resistance to change through dialogue and debate. Another example occurs with regard to the Armenian question. Secondly, the government has attempted to resolve bilateral problems and actively develop closer relations with neighbouring countries. The government has actually adopted a policy that it has referred to as ‘zero-problems with neighbours’. In that context, the government instigated regular high-level meetings with the government of the neighbouring countries as well as encouraging the development of closer cultural, economic and social relations. Thirdly, the government new foreign and security policy is a growing shift away from seeing the world from the perspective of ‘win-lose’ to ‘win-win’ games.”

According to Ali Karaosmanoglu, due to its historical and geopolitical circumstances, Turkey is influenced by two conflicting trends that characteristic the globalizing international system:

“On the one hand, its EU candidacy, NATO membership, its active performance in partnership for peace and participation in peace operations are inspiring internationalisation, multilateralism, cooperative security, democratic control of the armed forces, and emphasizes on societal and individual security. On the other hand, however, its regional environment is suggesting security through power politics and the sustained primacy of the nation state. Despite the adverse regional environment, Turkey has made strides to adapt to the internationalisation of security” (cited in Akcapar, 2007:69).

Turkish policymakers believe that in today’s security issues no single power has the capability to cope with dynamic and uncertain threats; international cooperation and multilateralism are the
only way to response the new security threats which are the multidimensional not a state or army, therefore multilateral is necessary to meet the threats. To the Defence Minister, ‘Turkey has given importance to develop multilateral and bilateral relationship with its neighbours to ensure peace and stability in the region. Thus, it has aimed in its national security policy; to be a security provider country, to be a power and balance component in its region and ensure cooperation, constructive relation with its neighbours’ (Defence Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2004:2). Therefore, Turkey has been playing a leading role in regional security cooperation since the late 1990s. It has actively engaged a number of regional multilateral efforts with the countries in the region. Turkey pursued multilateral diplomacy and bilateral ties in the Balkan crises. Although there were domestic pressures to intervene in the war between Serbs and Bosnians\(^{14}\), the government did not pursue unilateralist policies and called international community instead of unilateral intervention. It used the international organizations, such as NATO and UN to conclude the crises in the Balkans and developed its bilateral relations with all the Balkan countries except Serbia, in the political, military and economic fields. In addition, it pioneered a number of regional cooperation, such as the ‘Multinational Peace Force for the South East Europe and the Balkan Regional Brigade (SEEBRIG), aimed to act as a peacekeeping force in Balkan conflicts’ (Altunisik & Tur, 2005:129), and ‘sponsored a multilateral forum in the Middle East, known as the Regional Initiative or the Neighboring Countries Initiative’ (Winrow, 2005:6). After the end of the Cold War, Turkey developed close relations with the ex-Soviet Union states. It promoted economic, educational, social and political relations in the region to ensure and maintain peace and stability in the region. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, the Blackseafor\(^{15}\) and Black Sea Harmony\(^{16}\) are the two example of regional economic and

\(^{14}\) There are many Bosnian origin Turkish citizens who are politicians, businessmen, and academics in Turkey.

\(^{15}\) ‘The objective of Blackseafor is to render this force fully operational in combating asymmetrical threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction’ (Akcapar, 2007: 92).
political cooperation. Furthermore, in 2001, Turkey and Russia signed an ‘Action Plan for Cooperation between Turkey and Russia in Eurasia from Bilateral Cooperation to Multidimensional Partnership’ (Tanrisever, 2004:127) to cope with the regional problems in the Balkans, Russia, Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Turkey has had close cooperation with Israel in the mid-1990s on its fight against PKK. Both countries exchanged information about terror organizations, and activities. Thus, policy towards Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus were made and implemented in cooperation with Israel and the USA, called as a ‘strategic alliance’ (Gozen, 2004:38). The US is a great strategic partner of the Turkey. However, Turkey supports the US policy in Afghanistan, whereas the Turkish public strongly opposed the US and coalition forces attack on Iraq. This is due to the fact that not only invasion of Iraq and instability in Iraq are a security threat for Turkey, but also the people believe that the US and coalition forces invaded Iraq without a legitimate case.

**-Interaction Preferences of the Turkish elite:**

The empirical evidence is consistent with the government policy and academic views. According to the survey, Turkish elite considers that Turkish foreign and security policy is predominantly mixture of bilateral and multilateral character (Figure-2). More than half of the elite (57 per cent) believe that Turkey has pursued a multilateral approach as a response to the security threats, and 28 per cent believes that Turkey foreign policy is generally bilateral. Totally, 85 per cent considers that Turkey interaction preferences against the threats are primarily bilateral and multilateral policies. On the other hand, just 14 per cent of them believe that its security policy has unilateral character. General average of the responses is about 6.5\(^{17}\), which means Turkey’s

\(^{16}\) The objective of Black Sea Harmony is to conduct maritime surveillance operations against suspect vessel in the Black Sea. Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia joined this cooperation’ (Akcapar, 2007: 93).

\(^{17}\) It was assumed that interval 1-3 is unilateral, 4-6 is bilateral and 6-9 is multilateral.
interaction preferences are usually perceived towards a multilateral approach by the Turkish elites.

**Figure-2: Interaction Preferences of Turkish elite**

![Bar chart showing interaction preferences]

Source: Appendix, Question 10.

### 3.5.2. Institutional Preferences

Because of its precarious geo-strategic position of the land in a region where the interest of so many big powers compete, Turkey feels to initiate political and military alliances for collective defence (Soysal, 2004:44). Therefore, in the global context, Turkey’s security interests are closely linked to Europe. Turkey is a member of NATO, Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and candidate member of the EU and associate member of the Western European Union (WEU). Turkey is also a founding member of the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO).

Turkish National Defence Minister highlights the importance of these institutions for Turkey’s security, political and economic interests, and in struggling global threats:
“The UN, NATO, EU and OSCE are the most important international organizations, which ensure security against threats facing Turkey. Turkey believes that regional and global conflicts can be solved with the contributions of these institutions. Besides, he emphasizes that it has strategically importance and priority for Turkey to be part of European CSDP” (Defence Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2004:4).

NATO was the most important institution to meet threats of Turkey during the Cold War. It was a great shield against the Soviet Union threats and its expansionist policies. Turkey integrated with the Western Europe and US security structure through the NATO’s membership. In addition, Barchard claims that ‘NATO membership allowed for a continuous and spontaneous exchange of views between Turkey and its collective allies, and has enabled to Turkey to establish itself as a European power’ (Barchard, 1985:57).

The Turkish ruling class still assesses the NATO as the most significant institution for guaranteeing the security of the country. Although it is argued that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break up of the Soviet Union could decline importance of NATO, it continues to have a significant role in the Turkish defence and security policy. Turkey is one of the major members of NATO and Turkey has actively engaged almost all of the NATO activities. For instance, Turkey has been a strong advocate of NATO interventions in Europe related to the conflicts in Balkans. Turkish General Ilker Basbug stated that ‘the efforts of the NATO and EU and their decisions to take the responsibility in Bosnia have been perceived positively by the Turkish government. Turkey always has supported the presence of the NATO or EU in the region’ (Basbug, 2005:6).

The EU is also seen as a leading institution in securing stability in the region, especially in the Balkans. Turkey has a close relationship with the EU institutions, such as Europol and Eurojust on asylum and migration issues, judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters, cooperation in the field of drugs, police co-operation and fight against organised crime including
trafficking in human beings, economic crimes including fraud and cyber crimes. The government stresses mutual national interests with the EU on the guiding principle in foreign policy. It has ambitious pursued the goal of the EU membership since it became the ruling party in 2003. Therefore, the party is committed to fulfil the EU membership requirements. On security issues, ‘the AKP (Justice and Development Party-the government party) emphasizes Turkey’s commitment to NATO, also asserting, however, that Turkey deserves increased participation in the new Europe security system’ (Ayata, 2004:269).

Nevertheless, Turkish elites emphasize that the EU has not been ambitious to provide any assistance on the most important Turkey’s security threats, the PKK, although the EU classified it as a terrorist organization\(^\text{18}\). Turkish authorities declared several times that some of the EU member states have supported the PKK both financially and politically. Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Yaşar Büyükanıt, for instance, stated that ‘the PKK/Kongra-Gel terrorist organization is active in Europe with hundreds of foundations and associations. Terrorists wanted by red notices are free in our allied countries; the media organs owned by the terrorist organization, which promote terrorism, are still active in these countries without facing any restrictions’ (Today’s Zaman, 5 April 2008). Moreover, Prime Minister Erdoğan also said that ‘the PKK is still operating in many European countries under different names. Unfortunately they are being supported, in a speech at the 44th annual Munich Security Conference on 9 February 2008’ (Today’s Zaman, 11 February 2008). Because of direct or indirect support to the terrorist organization of some EU’s member states, Turkey experienced a number of crises with many Western European countries, such as Holland, Italy, Belgium, Germany, France and Greece as well as with others such as Russia, Syria and Iran.

\(^{18}\) According to the Council of the European Union Decision of 28 June 2007, ‘Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), (a.k.a. KADEK; a.k.a. KONGRA-GEL) and Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party (DHKP/C)’ are listed as terrorist organizations from Turkey (Council Decision, 2007:5).
The UN is another important institution for Turkey. Since end of the Cold War, Turkey has supported the UN’s international peacekeeping operations in various part of world. ‘Turkey is party to all twelve UN Conventions and Protocols on the combat with terrorism. Turkey also signed the International Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism on 14 September 2005. (Turkish MFA, 2007:25). Furthermore, Turkey signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974, the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1980, the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 (Erguvenc, 2006:83).

Turkey also is a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), whose purpose is to strengthen solidarity and cooperation among Islamic States in the political, economic, cultural, scientific and social fields. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, an eminent Turkish scholar, has been the general secretary of the OIC since 2004. Not only Turkey used the OIC an instrument ‘in shaping the policy of Muslim states towards the Bosnian crisis’ (Kramer, 2000:151), but also it promoted ‘an initiative to host a joint forum between the EU and the OIC promptly after the September 11 terrorist attacks’ (Akcapar, 2007:52).

In the economic field, Turkey is a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank or World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Turkey experienced two great economic crises in 1994 and 2001. Especially in 2001, it lived the greatest economic crisis in its history. The Turkish lira depreciated by almost 70 per cent against the USA dollar in 1994 and 135 per cent during the January-October 2001 (Altunisik & Tur, 2005:84-84). IMF provided economical funds in order to recovery from the economic crisis and Turkey has adopted an IMF-oriented reform program to strengthen its economy since the economic crisis of 2001. Furthermore, the World Bank provided social funds to be used for families living under certain living conditions.
The role of civil society has also been growing in an evolving conception of national security and foreign policy recently. It is currently possible to find examples of civil society involvement in foreign policy issues of both a low and high politics nature. With regard to low politics, a case in point is the cooperation that has taken place between the state authorities and civil society in combating the trafficking of women and illegal migration. Government agencies cooperate very closely with the Turkish as well as foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With regard to high politics issue, NGOs have also been a key element of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement (Kirisci, 2006:38-46).

-Turkish elite opinion on EU and ESDP-NATO relationship:

Figure-3 demonstrates the Turkish elite opinions on importance of the EU against the security threats facing Europe. In general, the elite consider that the EU has a very important role against the threats facing Europe. The elite believe that EU is very important particularly on providing ‘macroeconomic instability’; 79 per cent of respondents think that EU has a crucial role in struggling against ‘macroeconomic instability’. According to the same survey (see Figure-1), the Turkish elite perceives ‘macroeconomic instability’ as a major threat facing country in 2007. That is why the elite is pro-European. They believe that full membership of the EU will have a great contribution on solving Turkey’s economic problems.

The survey results demonstrate that, EU is also essential to meet the threats such as ‘narcotic trafficking, man-made environmental threats, criminalisation of economy, and migratory pressure. These threats are also seen as the significant threats facing Turkey by the elite in 2007.

Nevertheless, the elite think that the EU has a little role on issues such as ‘terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure, terrorist attacks to state/society, biological/chemical attack, natural disasters and pandemics, and nuclear/radiological attack’. The survey shows that the Turkish
foreign and security elite perceive ‘terrorist attacks to state/society’ and ‘natural disasters and pandemics’ as the main threats. Thus, the empirical evidence concludes that the EU has a less important role in response to these threats facing Turkey.

In conclusion, the survey results explain that on the one hand, the EU has a very important role in response to ‘macroeconomic instability, narcotic trafficking, criminilisation of economy, ethnic conflict’ problems facing Turkey. On the other hand, it is little important for Turkey in struggling against ‘terrorist attacks to state/society and natural disasters and pandemics’ challenges.

Source: Appendix, Question 3.
Figure-4 reflects the Turkish elite opinions on ESDP-NATO relationship. While Turkey is a member of NATO, it is not a part of the ESDP. It is difficult to derive an absolute result from the survey. The survey provides a data that half of the respondents consider that a more autonomous ESDP could either partly or fully weaken NATO. 41 per cent of respondents believe that the creation of a more autonomous ESDP will not weaken NATO or will only do a little, whereas 16 per cent perceives that a powerful ESDP will highly affect the role of NATO, and one third thinks that it will partly weaken NATO. It can be said that the Turkish elite do not have clear opinion on ESDP-NATO relationship.

![Figure-4: Does ESDP weaken NATO?](image)

Source: Appendix, Question 7.

The USA is the most important member of NATO. It has predominantly shaped the policies of NATO. If ESDP weakens the role of NATO on security issues, can it cause to lead to the USA retrenchment? The survey shows that the elite believe the importance of NATO on the European security. Majority of the Turkish elite believe that weaker NATO will decrease the responsibility of NATO on the European security: while 32 per cent of elite answers that weaker NATO will have a negative effect on European security, 20 per cent believes it will not. In addition, 42 per
cent of respondents considers that it is possible a retrenchment of the US commitment to the security of Europe (Figure-5).

**Figure-5: Does a weaker NATO lead to US retrenchment?**

![Bar chart showing responses to the question](chart.png)

Source: Appendix, Question 8.

Figure-6 shows the importance of transatlantic relationship. The survey explains that American commitment is very important for European security. About three fourth of the elite believe the importance of the USA commitment on European security: nearly half of the Turkish elite (47 per cent) answers that the US commitment is important; whilst 26 per cent of them expresses that it is very important and essential for the security of Europeans. On the other hand, 20 per cent believes that the US commitment is not very important and only 6 per cent claims that it is not crucial for security of the EU.

In summary, according to the Turkish elite, NATO and USA are still very significant factors for the security of Europeans. Although a powerful ESDP can ensure stability and security in Europe, however, it will cause to weaken of roles of NATO and USA on European security.
3.5.3. Instrumental Preferences

Turkey’s security approach to the threats, called ‘confrontationist policy’ (Kirisci, 2006:21) was gradually abandoned from 1999 onwards. Support for the UN’s Plan on Cyprus by the Turkish government, initiating to use soft power instruments in struggling against the terrorist organization, improvement of relations with all its immediate neighbours are a few example of the changes in Turkish foreign and security policy. The Turkish government advocates the importance of promoting economic and commercial relations with all neighbouring countries to promote peace and security. Kirisci claims that ‘new Turkish foreign policy has been much more open to cooperation, dialogue and to the notion of searching for ‘win-win’ outcomes to international conflicts’ (Kirisci, 2006:18).

Turkey principally gives primacy to the peaceful resolution consistent with the diplomatic, economic and other crisis management measures regarding the crisis that concern Turkey’s security. Nevertheless, it perceives the importance of deterrence power of the Turkish Armed Forces against the threats facing the country. Therefore, the Turkish elite believes that the
Turkish Armed Forces always must be ready as a deterrence power to prevent likely conflicts and risks surrounding Turkey.

The Defence Strategy has been built on the four pillars of ‘deterrence, crisis management and collective security’ (Defence Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2004:1). In this context, Defence Strategy of Turkey aims at; ‘to determine domestic and foreign threats as early as possible, to use all the national forces within cooperation against these threats, to meet possible attacks outside the borders, to prepare Turkish Army Forces all the threats’ (Defence Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2004:1-2).

Regarding international threats and conflicts, Turkey attaches importance to international peacekeeping operations to ensure stability and peace in the different parts of the world. Therefore, it has actively participated peacekeeping efforts in terms of military force and financial aid and considerably supported for various UN, NATO, OSCE and EU-led missions. Ever since the Korean War, Turkey has been actively contributing to the UN’s peacekeeping efforts. It has also participated in all operations led by NATO in the Balkans since 1995. According to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

“Turkey currently takes part in several UN peacekeeping operations around the world. Its participation extends not only to those UN missions operating in its immediate vicinity, but also to distant missions, such as in Haiti, Georgia, Lebanon, Liberia, East Timor and Sudan. Turkish Armed Forces continue to serve with distinction in such NATO operations as ISAF in Afghanistan, KFOR in Kosovo, Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean and the Military Training Mission for Iraq. Turkey has also participated to EU-led police missions in Macedonia, Kinshasa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the EUFOR-ALTHEA operation, and the UN police mission (UNMIK) in Kosovo” (Turkish MFA, 2007:4).

Turkey makes considerable financial contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations and reconstruction activities. According to the OECD, Turkey contributed 0.7 billion US
Dollars, corresponding to 0.18% of its GNI as Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2006 (OECD, Development Assistance Committee, 2007:8).

In addition, Turkey established a Partnership for Peace Training Centre to train peacekeepers in 1998. This Centre has organized 236 courses and 9 seminars and provided training to almost seven thousand peacekeepers from 65 different countries. Turkey is committed to cooperating with the UN Secretariat for the training of UN peacekeepers in this Centre (Ilkin, 2007:2).

Regarding Iran nuclear power acquisition, Turkey has supported the EU’s constructive engagement policy and policy of dialogue with Iran. ‘Turkey both has advocated the decisions of the UN Security Council and tried to persuade Iran to seriously consider the package that had been put together by Germany and the UN Security Council’ (Kirisci, 2006:75). On the other hand, related to Russia, which was a main threat during the Cold War era, Turkish policymakers believe that ‘the enhancement of trade between the two countries is the best to develop political relations’ (Soysal, 2004:45).

The Turkish government believes that soft and hard power should implement together and they can jointly produce more efficient outcomes in struggling against separatist terror organization in southeastern part of Turkey. On the one hand, Turkey initiates several cross-border operations in northern Iraq against the PKK. On the other hand, drastic constitutional changes and reforms were adopted by the Turkish Parliament, and several economic and social programs have announced and implemented in the southeast region of Turkey to prevent the PKK illegal activities. As a result of this new approach of the government, the ruling party gained much more votes than Democratic Society Party\(^\text{19}\) did in southeastern part of Turkey in ‘general election’ (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2007) in 2007. Finally, ‘Turkey’s government is planning a broad series of investments worth as much as $12 billion in the country’s largely Kurdish southeast, in a

\(^{19}\) The Party is known as a political dimension of the PKK terrorist organization and has pursued a policy based on ethnicity.
new economic effort intended to create jobs and draw young men away from militancy’ (Tavernise, 12 March 2008, New York Times). According to Kirisci traditionally there are two approaches on the issue:

“The dominant and hard-line approach had seen the problem as externally driven and has pursued what is basically a military way of dealing with it. The more moderate and liberal approach has seen the problem mostly social, economic and cultural and has advocated political reforms in support of greater democracy and pluralism in Turkey and economic reforms aim at achieving greater development in the east and southeast of Turkey, where traditionally most Kurds have lived. The hard-line approach long dominated governmental decision-making in Turkey, regarding both domestic and foreign policy-making. However, after the capture of the leader of PKK, the gap between the moderates and hard-liners diminished” (Kirisci, 2004:279)

In international area, Turkey participated peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, but it also ‘provided financial, economic and humanitarian assistance, trained the new Federation’s and contributed institutional assistance in education, construction and judiciary’ (Kut, 2000:84). When the Central Asia states became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey supported the states both politically and economically. Turkey has been setting up industry region and has a project called peace campus including school, hospital and education centre in Palestine in order to contribute peace as a civilian power. In addition, Kirisci assesses that ‘business interactions with the region will help to increase contracts, the development of mutual interest and interdependence as well as modestly assist the emergence of a civil society (Kirisci, 2006:97). These are all soft power tools used by Turkey in order to ensure stability and peace in its environment.

Diplomacy is seen another important instrument response to the threats. Ankara believes that using the military force, in the respond to threats is the last choice. In terrorism problem, for
instance, Ankara toughened its line against the PKK after a spate of rebel attacks inside Turkey that prompted widespread calls for action. In October 2007, ‘Turkey's parliament voted to allow the military to launch operations into Iraq to combat the PKK, which had stepped up attacks in Turkey’ (BBC News, 1 December 2007). Turkish Armed Forces launched massive cross-border military operations in northern Iraq against the PKK targets on ‘16 of December 2007’ (Today’s Zaman, 16 December 2007) and on ‘21 February 2008’ (Today’s Zaman, 22 December 2007). To prevent the international reaction against, the Turkish government firstly had pursued a close diplomacy by setting several meetings with the Iraqi government, the US and the EU, before the cross-border operation started. The Turkish high authorities has toured the EU, USA and the Middle East, telling that Turkey’s security is under threat due because of the PKK presence in neighbouring northern Iraq and that any Turkish military action would solely target the PKK and not the people of Iraq. Turkish government also gave assurances that Turkey respected Iraq's land and stability. The US and the EU emphasized Turkey’s right to defend itself in the face of a terrorist threat. The cross-border operation took place after the US provided intelligence and assisted by allowing Turkey to use Iraqi airspace. In addition, The US has provided logistical, technical and political support to Turkey. Immediate withdrawal of Turkish army after the cross-border operations into Northern Iraq and Iraqi president’s visit to Turkey just after the military operation have also demonstrated that the main goal of Turkey is the terrorist organization’s bases but not Iraq.

The Turkish security experts have evaluated this operation as a diplomatic and military success of Turkey. Özdem Sanberk, a former foreign ministry undersecretary and an esteemed foreign policy analyst, recalling the complications that similar cross-border operations in the 1990s caused for Turkish foreign policy, said ‘The success is a result of diplomatic initiatives. Without diplomacy, the international protests would have cancelled out any military benefits that such an operation brought.’

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20 A powerful bomb, triggered by a suicide bomber, outside a crowded shopping mall in Turkey’s capital Ankara killed 8 people and injured 89 other on may 22 2007 (Yılmaz, 2007:8)
operation could bring’ (cited in Demirelli, 18 December 2007, Today’s Zaman). On the other hand, Sedat Laçiner, head of the Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organization (USAK), stated that ‘the military operation was made possible by intense pre-operation diplomacy with the US and other countries’ (cited in Demirelli, 18 December 2007, Today’s Zaman). It can be assessed that reactions of the EU against the Turkish military operations into Northern Iraq is very weak comparing to those of 10 years ago.

Although, the Turkish elites believe the importance of soft power, when necessary Turkey has used the military measures as an ‘ultima ratio’ against the security threats. For instance, Turkish Military Forces has actively involved in northern Iraq in struggling against the PKK and performed several cross-border military operations particularly in 2007 and 2008.

Related to the challenging against religious extremism, the Turkish army has seen itself as responsible of the secular Turkish Republic. The armed forces have intervened in Turkish politics four times, lastly in 1997 since 1960 when they felt that the territorial integrity and secular state were under threat (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003:27). Many Islamic Parties such as the Welfare Party becoming ruling party in 1996, the Virtue Party and their leading figures were banned politically. However, the intervention has accelerated the transformation of the Islamic movement, which has undergone an important evolution in recent years. All major Islamic groups have become more ‘pro-European’. ‘Once firm opponents of Turkey’s membership in the EU, the Islamic groups currently are one of the strongest supporters of the Turkish membership, which they see as an important guarantee of their religious and political rights’ (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003:62). The ruling party, emerged from the banned Islamic rooted Virtue Party, has pursued a pro-European policies and its leader and present prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated in his speech that ‘they would neither base their politics on Islam, nor use Islam for rhetorical purposes’ (cited in Altunisik & Tur, 2005:64), and the party programme underlined ‘the necessity of further integration with the EU and the global system and world market’ (Altunisik & Tur, 2005:65).
-Instrumental Preferences of the Turkish elite:

In general terms, the survey supports the government policies and academic views. The Turkish elite considers that the government has pursued both hard and soft power tools to meet threats facing the country. Figure-7 shows that half of the elite assess that Turkey’s government conceive security as a both ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’: 52 per cent of the elite states that Turkey follows soft and hard power together. 29 per cent of the respondents believe that the government generally pursues soft power, whereas 19 per cent states that the government uses military power as a response to the threats facing Turkey.

![Figure-7: Instrumental Preferences of Turkish elite](image)

Source: Appendix, Question 11.

As it is stated at Figure-1, the main threats perceived by the Turkish elite in 2007, are, in order, terrorist attacks against the state and society, macroeconomic instability, the criminalisation of the economy, natural disasters and pandemics, and ethnic conflict. The survey conducted by author also demonstrates the Turkish elite answers on policy instruments against these threats. From an overview of the responses, the majority of the elite would appear to prefer non-military solutions, such as diplomacy, economic and financial assistance, and cooperation between the
police force and intelligence services. Those instruments indicated as most effective to tackle the main threats of Turkey.

As it is shown at the Table-6; ‘police cooperation and intelligence sharing’ is assessed the most important instrument to meet the terrorist attacks threat by the Turkish elites. Accordingly, ‘diplomacy, economical and financial assistance, military forces and special operations’ are perceived other important policies. Related to the macroeconomic instability, ‘ economical and financial assistance’ is seen as a most important instrument by the respondents. More that half of the elites stated that ‘ economical and financial assistance, and police cooperation and intelligence sharing’ are the most important responses to meet criminilisation of economy threats in Turkey. 73 per cent of the elites believe that ‘ economical and financial assistance’ instrument prevents likely economic conflict in Turkey, whereas ‘diplomacy and police cooperation and intelligence sharing’ are seen other important policies. Related to natural disaster and pandemics, the Turkish elites believe that all policy instruments except ‘military force’ are nearly equal importance to meet the threat.

Turkey used only military power to meet terrorism until the end of the 1990s. However, its policy towards the terrorism has begun to change since then. Economical and social programs have been announced by the government, more democratic changes were made in Turkish Constitutional Law, and diplomatic efforts were started with its neighbours to tackle terrorism. The elite survey results are clearly consistent with the government polices. Majority of the elite believe that ‘diplomacy, economic-financial assistances, and police cooperation and intelligence sharing are more important than military power in response to terrorist attacks. In addition, the elite also believe importance of soft power tools in response to ‘ethnic conflict’ threat.

In summary, Table-6 clearly shows that the elite are consistent with the government on instrumental preferences. The elite do not consider that military power is the most important
instruments to meet terrorist attacks and ethnic conflict which are the gravest threats facing the country.

**Table-6**: Turkish elite’s policy instruments to meet the gravest threats facing Turkey in 2007:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments to Meet Threats</th>
<th>Diplomacy (%)</th>
<th>Economic-Financial Assistance (%)</th>
<th>Police Coop. and Intelligence sharing (%)</th>
<th>Traditionally Military (%)</th>
<th>Special Operations (%)</th>
<th>Other (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist attacks to State/society</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroconmic Instability</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminilisation of Economy</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Disaster and Pandemics</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Appendix, Question 2. (Every respondent identified more than one instrument to meet the security threats.)

Table-7 shows the differences of Turkish threat perceptions and policy preferences before and after 2000. In general terms, threat perceptions of the country are similar; however, organized crime, and proliferation of WMDs are perceived as the threats after 2000. Turkey has focused on instability in Iraq after 2000. In addition, not only PKK has threatened the Turkish society, but also international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda have targeted Turkey after 2000.

Turkish policy preferences have begun to change after 2000. It’s foreign and security policy has been tended to more bilateral-multilateral character, and more based on soft power tools since the Helsinki Declaration.
Table 7: Threat Perceptions and Policy Preferences of Turkey before and after 2000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Perceptions</th>
<th>Before 2000</th>
<th>After 2000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union/Communism (until 1990s), Terrorism, Regional Conflicts (Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus), Religious Extremism.</td>
<td>Terrorist Organizations, Regional Conflicts (esp. instability in Iraq), Religious Extremism, Economic Instability, Organized Crime, proliferation of WMDs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction Preferences</th>
<th>Predominantly unilateral, Partly bilateral and multilateral, passive foreign policy</th>
<th>Combination of bilateral and multilateral responses, (if necessary) unilateral, active foreign policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO (particularly Cold War era), UN</td>
<td>NATO, UN, OSCE, EU and WTO-IMF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrumental Preferences</th>
<th>Primarily military power, cross-border operations, peace-keeping operations</th>
<th>Combination of soft and hard power tools; diplomacy, peace operations, economic-development aids, military cross-border operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: The Turkish Government policies and documents, and academic views.

3.6. Allocation of Resources

Military expenditures of a state demonstrate a clue about its policy preferences to security threats. A state, that gives priority hard power tools rather than soft power tools, has a high-level defence budget and its military expenditure keeps important in its general budget. Policymakers of such a state perceive their military force as the most important deterrence power in response to security threats. In addition, changes of the military expenditures of a state in a certain period time would show the changes in policy preferences of a state. If military expenditures of a state decrease
gradually in certain period, this shows that it gives less importance military power. Thus, the Turkish military expenditures shown below would contribute to understand Turkish policy preferences.

The Turkish elite feel that there is a great conflict risk and uncertainty in its immediate neighbourhood and that is a direct effect on its security interests. Additionally, although NATO is a significant role in shaping Turkey defence policy, they argue that NATO is only of limited value for guaranteeing military security against the new risks Turkey, due to the ‘NATO’s search for a new role, strategy and organizations’ (Kramer, 2000:202) in a developing new world order. Thus, Turkey is mainly based on its military force in order to guarantee its national security and has attempted a great effort to develop and strengthen its national military and industrial capabilities.

In its National Defence Policy, Turkey aims to be ‘an element of power and stabilization in its region’, and to form a ‘Peace and Security Zone in its surroundings’ (Defence Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2004:2). Due to being the centre of the instability region, the government also believes that, Turkey must have a strong national defence system, thus, wants to modernize and increase military capabilities to meet conventional and asymmetric threats. In addition, it has granted importance national defence industry. While the proportion of domestic defence industry in terms of its military requirements was 25 per cent in 2002, currently it is approximately 50 per cent (the Program of the 60th –present- Government, 2007).

Security analyst Gokhan Kocer claims that ‘it is necessary for Turkey to keep its military expenditures at a certain level since it is at the centre of interface of the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea Middle East and Caucasus’ (Kocer, 2002:128), and retired general Erguvenc states that ‘Turkey’s geographical privilege obliges Turkey to keep a strong defence and military force’ (Erguvenc, 1998:4).
Turkey is one of the major military powers in the world. ‘Turkey ranked 14th country in terms of military expenditures in purchasing power parity in the world in 2005’ (The Sipri Yearbook 2007). The level of training and equipment is high, assuring Turkey a credible defensive capability. The Turkish air force hawks the second largest number of F-16 fighter jets after the US. Nevertheless, it has no nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and is a party to all associated international legal treaties and arrangements (Akcpar, 2007:45).

This security-oriented policy has caused great economic costs for Turkey’s budget. ‘The cost of Turkey’s security policies has been estimated roughly around $ 100 billion since 1985; spending above $ 50 billion for fighting against PKK terror, and losing about $ 50 billion due to suspension of economic and commercial relations with Iraq’ (Gozen, 2004:44). Furthermore, ‘to sustain security in the region and to fight against the PKK, the Turkish government has been deploying around 120.000 soldiers in South East Anatolia’ (Bagci & Bal, 2002:13).

**Table-8: Turkish Defence Budget (1990-2005):**

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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Exp. in US $ (million)</td>
<td>10564</td>
<td>11420</td>
<td>13131</td>
<td>14339</td>
<td>15322</td>
<td>14046</td>
<td>13265</td>
<td>11851</td>
<td>10778</td>
<td>10301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Exp. as % of GDP</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table-8 shows the Turkish Defence Budget in between 1990 and 2005. During the 1990s, Turkey allocated a large amount of its sources to military expenditures and attempted to its military capacity at deterrence level. The military expenditures of Turkey increased sharply between 1990 and 2000 due to the instability in Turkey’s immediate neighbours, such as the Gulf war in Iraq, Bosnia War in Balkans, and increasing terrorist attacks by PKK during the 1990s. After it peaked
in 2000 as 15322 million US $, military expenditures have been gradually declined since then. Military expenditures in terms of per cent of GDP have also decreased since 2000. There are many reasons behind the decreasing in military expenditures of Turkey. Firstly, partly peaceful situation was provided in the Balkans and Middle East. Secondly, détente process started relations with Greece and Syria after 2000. Thirdly, after the capture of leader of terrorist organization in 1999, number of terrorist activities drastically dropped in Turkey. Finally, modernization process in the Turkish army has started such as shortening duration of military service, and focusing on domestic military industry.

Table-9: Number of Turkish Military Force in 1990-2007 (thousand):

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces (military)</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table-9 demonstrates that although there is a fluctuation military force in between 1990-2007 years, there is a drastically decrease number of Turkish army forces after 2000 and has slightly decreased since 2003. Compulsory military service and high young population in Turkey are the main reasons why number of Turkish military forces is pretty high. According to the Turkish law, every male of Turkish citizen has to serve in the military forces for a certain period depending on education level.
- The Turkish elite opinion on military expenses of Turkey:

The survey clearly shows that majority of the elite consider that the Turkish defence expenditure is sufficient to meet the threats (Figure-8). More than half of the elites (56 per cent) answer that the size of the Turkish defence budget is the appropriate size to meet the country’s security threats; 29 per cent of respondents consider that defence budget is too large; 15 per cent claims that Turkey expends too little money for the defence budget.

**Figure-8: Size of Defence Budget**

![Bar chart showing the distribution of respondents' opinions on the size of the defence budget.](source: Appendix, Question 4.)

In the issue of distribution of budget, majority of the elite (69 per cent) consider that current Turkish defence budget is well distributed to meet the national security meets, whereas 31 percent of them do not think (Figure-9).

**Figure-9: Budget distribution matches the security needs**

![Bar chart showing the distribution of respondents' opinions on the budget distribution.](source: Appendix, Question 5.)
While two thirds of the people who do not believe that the distribution of the defence budget meets the security threats state that personnel expenditures are too much, just 5 per cent believes it is too little. More than half of them (57 per cent) claim that procurement expenditures are enough, whereas 28 per cent believes it is too little and 14 per cent believes that it is too large. While the elite believe that the cost of personnel too large, they think that the share of research and development expenditure is too little. All of the elites who do not believe that the distribution of the defence budget meets the security threats claim that research and development expenditures of Turkey are too little (Figure-10).

Source: Appendix, Question 6.
4. COMPARISON OF SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND RESPONSES BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

This chapter aims to compare the security threat perceptions and security policies of Turkey and the EU. I summarize briefly the evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy in the first section. In the second section, I compare the security policies of the EU and Turkey. This includes looking at security threat perceptions, and the responses to those threats of the EU and Turkey. I also examine the opinions of Turks and Europeans on challenges posed by threats. In addition, I compare the military expenditures of the EU and Turkey, since it gives knowledge about the weight of military force as a tool in response to threats. I include figures for the military expenditures of the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Germany, since they are the most important political and military powers in the EU. In the final section, I outline security issues between the EU and Turkey, as well as the importance of Turkey for the EU in terms of security.

4.1. The Evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy

After conflict and tension among European states and two destructive world wars, Europeans aimed to protect themselves from internal and external threats. It has been argued that cooperation needs to exist among the European states to ensure political and economic security, and stability. In this context, the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Treaty in 1948. According to the Treaty, the states should provide ‘all the military and other aid and assistance in their power in the event of any attack’ (McCormick, 2004:50).

In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed among the US, the UK, the Benelux countries, France, Denmark, Canada, Portugal, Iceland, Italy and Norway. The Treaty created NATO that

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21 McCormick claims (2004:57-58) that ‘Nationalism’ was a major internal threat whereas ‘the Soviet Union’ was the most serious external threat to Europeans after the World War II.”
aims to ensure the security of the members against the Soviet Union threat. To Article 5 of the Treaty, NATO members agree that:

‘An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’ (North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5).

Although NATO provided Europe more security, it was an unbalanced alliance; the US exercised most of the political influence over NATO policy (McCormick, 2004: 50-51). Therefore, the European states attempted to establish their own defence system by creating a European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952. Its objective was to promote the Western European cooperation on defence. However, it could not realize when the French National Assembly did not ratify it in 1954 (Menon, 2004:222).

Following the failure of the EDC, the Brussels Treaty partners established the WEU by joining with West Germany and Italy in 1955. The aim of the WEU was ‘to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe’ (McCormick, 2004:51). Furthermore, in 1962, France attempted to develop closer political and military cooperation among the members of the EC the Fouchet Plan, but it failed (Dover, 2007:238).

In 1970, the EC members agreed on European Political Cooperation (ECP), which consisted of regular meetings of foreign ministers and foreign ministry officials to coordinate national foreign policies. However, it was argued as ‘loose and voluntary foreign policy cooperation, since member states could still act independently and most of key decisions had to be arrived at unanimously’ (McCormick, 2004, 331). Nevertheless, it could be assessed that ‘not only EPC
was able to secure opportunities for dialogue amongst the European Community’s members, but also it was a forerunner to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Dover, 2007:239).

At the beginning of 1990s, in the process of the European Integration, the EU (along with the US) became one of the two biggest economic powers in the world. Nevertheless, in terms of security policy, the EU as a whole has been unable to become a significant military and diplomatic power. The EU was still unable to take common positions on significant security issues such as Arab-Israeli dispute or the Gulf War in 1990. In the mean time, the collapse of the communism in the Soviet Bloc, disruptions in some former communist countries such as Yugoslavia and reunification of Germany had changed the concept of the security. ‘All these developments forced the EU to take a long and hard look at foreign policy’ (McCormick, 2004:332).

As a result of these developments, the members of the EU agreed on ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) under the Maastricht Treaty (also known Treaty on the European Union) in 1992. Article 11 of the Maastricht Treaty defines the objective of the CFSP:

a) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;

b) to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;

c) to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;

d) to promote international cooperation;

e) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

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22 The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) was signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 11 November 1993.
Article 12 of the Treaty determines the main policy instruments of the CFSP as the ‘Common Strategies, Common Positions and Joint Actions’. The WEU would be developed as the defence element of the EU according to the Article 17 of the Treaty. Beyond these policy tools, the EU would use also other instruments including diplomacy, political pressure, trade sanctions, economic and financial assistance, and technical, scientific, cultural and other forms of cooperation (Nugent, 2003:422).

In 1997, by the Amsterdam Treaty, a closer association between the WEU and the EU were ensured, and the Petersberg Tasks\(^{23}\) were incorporated into the EU treaties. Only WEU members were responsible for the Petersberg Tasks, however, the Amsterdam Treaty committed all the EU member states to the tasks. In addition these, the Treaty created a High Representative for the CFSP (Bache & George, 2006:524).

Nonetheless, the experience of the crises in the Gulf, Bosnia and Kosovo all showed the weakness of the EU as a political actor in international crises. The tragedy in former Yugoslavia did have a beneficial effect in bringing the UK and France closer together and the failure of the EU to act in Bosnia and Kosovo provided the impetus for a move to extent CFSP to security and defence (Bache & George, 2006:523). Therefore, a significant development was ensured related to common European defence policy, when British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac met in St Malo summit in December 1998. After the summit, they jointly announced their support for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and declared that the ‘EU should be in a position to play a full role in international affairs’ (McCormick, 2004:336).

After the disappearance of the disagreement between the UK and France at St Malo summit, at the June 1999 Cologne summit a declaration was issued ‘on strengthening of the CFSP through

\(^{23}\) ‘The Petersberg tasks were first identified at a 1992 WEU conference and focused on ‘crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks’ (Nugent, 2003:417).
the creation of an ESDP. At the December 1999 Helsinki summit, it was agreed on a ‘Headline Goal’ under which, by 2003, an EU-led Rapid Reaction Force of up to 50,000-60,000 persons would be created, capable of being deployed within the 60 days, of being sustained at least 1 year, and a focused on the full range of Petersberg tasks. At the June 2000 Feira summit, member states committed themselves to provide up to 5000 civilian police officers within 30 days for crisis situations. There was also agreement on the creation of a Rapid Reaction Mechanism to enable emergency civilian aid to be available quickly to help stabilise crises (Nugent, 2003:419-420).

The ESDP is composed of three elements: military crisis management, civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. It has both the military and civilian dimension. The military side of ESDP was introduced at Helsinki resulted in the so-called Headline Goal, whilst Nice provided the institutional structures, which are the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC), and the Military Stuff (EUMS). On the other hand, the aim of the civilian side of ESDP is to fill the ‘soft security gaps left open by the international community. Police Cooperation, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection are the four institutional arrangements to fill the gaps’ (Dover, 2007:245). The main objective of all these new structures and arrangements regarding the security and defence policy of the EU is ‘the promotion of an autonomous EU capacity in security and defence and the development of a common defence policy’ (Kirchner, 2007b:114).

After the process of common policies on foreign, security and defence issues in the EU, in December 2003, Brussels summit, the EU formally adopted ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ as the European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS is a respond to threats to its security and ‘widely seen as a reply to the USA’s National Security Strategy of 2002’ (Dover, 2007:249). The EU announced the global challenges and main threats facing the EU and its member states, and
significance of the EU as a global player in combating the common threats through the ESS. According to the Kirchner

“The end of the Cold War, the emergence of the new security threats, the failure of the EU in Bosnia and Kosovo crises, disagreement among the member states related to the Iraq conflict, the growing tensions in transatlantic relations, the need to respond to the so-called Bush security doctrine of 2002, criminal and terrorist activities in the borders of the EU are the main reasons of the production of the ESS” (Kirchner, 2007b:113-114):.

The ESS is an opportunity in establishment a convergence among EU member states’ security policy. Quille highlights (2004:429-430) that ‘the absence of a security strategy could be an obstacle to developing a European strategic culture’. Kirchner assessed that the EU as a regional organization, has an instructive role in three ways:

“First, the EU stresses the importance of regional organization and regional integration together with multilateralism in the task of promoting international security. In turn, many others regions look to the EU as an illustration of the benefits of regional integration. Second, the EU is involved in certain regions with specific tasks. For example, in the Asian region the EU supports the rebuilding of Afghanistan, assists the establishment of democratic governments in Cambodia and East Timor, and seeks a solution to the Korean Peninsula problem. Third, the EU engages in joint or mutually reinforcing security functions with the UN as well as with NATO and the OSCE” (Kirchner, 2007a:14-15)

In conclusion, ‘European security cultures, although still distinct, have converged substantially since the fall of the Berlin Wall’ (Meyer, 2006:1-2).
4.2. Comparison between the EU and Turkey in terms of Security Threat Perceptions

First of all, the EU and Turkey perceive the security threats in different dimension and level. While the EU, including 27 member states, naturally perceives predominantly the security threats at a global level, Turkey as a middle size power comprehends them at the regional level. The EU, as a global player, could be influenced from the instability or conflict in any part of world. Regional conflicts such as ‘the Middle East, Kashmir, the Great Lakes and the Korean peninsula’ (ESS:4) are seen as threats that may impact on European interests ‘directly and indirectly’. However, Turkey as a regional power is mostly affected by threats coming from its immediate regions; the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Therefore, it can be said that the EU develops more comprehensive strategy against the risks than Turkey does.

Nonetheless, Duke claims that “ESS is certainly global in outlook and references are made to global security, but the primary concerns clearly remain regional or littoral (especially the Middle East). Even the ESS, which refers to ‘a secure Europe in a better world’ in its title, puts the main emphasis on security in ‘building security in our neighbourhood’ (ESS:7), while acknowledging the need for multilateral approaches to many international security issues either through partnership or working with regional and international organizations” (Duke, 2004:464). The EU generally gives primacy to built security zone in its neighbourhood, such as in Middle East, Eastern Europe, Caucasus and North Africa. However, the EU-led operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo or actively participation peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan demonstrate clearly that the EU has perceived the security threats in global scale.

The EU and Turkey explain the features of the new threats in the context of broader meaning of security. The ESS defines new character of security as a global nature; ‘the post Cold War environment as one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of
security are indissolubly linked’ (ESS:3). It is stated that conventional war or military attack against the EU’s member states is not likely today, however, new threats are more varied, complex, and ambiguous. ‘Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable’ (ESS:4). ‘In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military’, but ‘the new threats are dynamic’ (ESS:8).

Similarly, Turkey claims that new threats, emerging in the post-Cold War era, are asymmetric and uncertain; ‘After the collapse of the bipolar world order, power vacuum, which occurred in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, has increased the global ambiguity and led to geopolitical vulnerability in these regions… asymmetric threats came on the agenda’ (Defence Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2004:1). Nevertheless, on the contrary to the EU, Turkish policymakers believe that a military attack against the Republic of Turkey is possible; therefore, defence policy of Turkey is designed to preserve and protect the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

When it is compared of types of main security threats, it would be seen that three threats, ‘terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts’ are commonly defined as the gravest threats both by the EU and Turkey. In the ESS, ‘terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime’ (ESS:3-4) are perceived as the key threats, whereas ‘terrorism, the threat of long-range missiles and WMD, religious extremism and regional conflicts’ are seen the main threats facing Turkey in the Turkish Defence Policy. States failure and organized crimes, although perceived a serious threat by the Turkish government, are not acknowledged as the main threats in the document.

Of the threats, the EU emphasizes that the ‘most frightening scenario is the one in which terrorists groups acquire weapons of mass destruction’ (ESS:4); they may then be ‘willing to use
unlimited violence to cause massive casualties’ (ESS:3). In this context, the PKK has been perceived the gravest challenge to Turkey’s territorial and national integrity by the government. It is frightened that the terrorist activities would cause a great chaos among the Turkish people, particularly in major cities of Turkey.

Specific examples of failed states are given by the ESS: ‘Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban’ (ESS:4) and these are seen as undermining global governance and causing regional instability. However, although Turkey does not mention about ‘failed states’ as a threat, it gives priority to ensure stability in its neighbour states. For example, Turkey is extremely interested in preserving the stability and the unity of Iraq as well as in Georgia.

The civilian matters, economic interests, transport, energy supply, information infrastructure of the EU and its natural resources are the main targets for terrorist attacks, especially, ‘the open and tolerant civil societies’ of the member states are perceived as a central target for terrorists (Kirchner, 2007b:117). Besides, ESS states that ‘Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked’ (ESS:3). In fact, the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004, and the coordinated bombings on three underground trains and a bus in London in 2005, have brought into sharp focus the threats that the EU faces in the post-Cold War era (Dover, 2007:249).

In Turkish perception, ‘state’ is at the centre of target: the Turkish authorities acknowledge the national independence and integrity of the country as the main targets for terrorist and other attacks. Furthermore, civilian population and critical infrastructures such as bridges, dams, oil pipeline and military facilities are always targets of terrorist organizations. For example, ‘a terrorist attack, outside a crowded shopping mall in Turkey’s capital Ankara killed 8 people and injured 89 other in 2007’ (Yılmaz, 2007:8) and thousands of civil people and solders have been killed by the PKK since 1984.
The EU perceives ‘Al Qaeda’ as the main terrorist organization, whereas Turkey knows PKK the most serious terrorist organization against the country. The ESS mentions the name of the terrorist organization: ‘Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium’ (ESS:3). The ESS was declared in 2003, therefore it was affected the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and reflects risks posed by the ‘Al Qaeda’ terrorist attacks.

Related to the geographical source of the threats, the EU perceives the threats as the global scale and the ESS identifies ‘certain regions’ as the main threats facing the Europeans; ‘In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe’ (ESS:6). Problems such as poverty, disease, conflict, criminality, competition for natural resources and problematic economic activity in developing countries are seen the other threats against the EU.

Turkey as a middle power state, generally considers that main threats have emanated from its immediate regions; the Caucasus, Middle East and the Balkans are explicitly defined as ‘the most unstable regions in the World’ (Defence Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2004:1). Whilst nuclear activities in North Korea or nuclear risks in South Asia have not accepted as direct threats against Turkey, the conflict in Iraq, nuclear activities in Iran, frozen conflicts (instability in Georgia and disagreements in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan) in the Caucasus, the Palestine-Israeli conflicts, possible conflicts in the Balkans, the Cyprus issue with Greece have been perceived as the security risks facing the country.

Table-10 summarizes the security threat perceptions of the EU and Turkey. Terrorism, proliferation of WMD, organized crimes and regional conflicts are commonly perceived as the main threats by the EU and Turkey. Nevertheless, the other main threats facing the EU are state
failure and organized crime, whereas religious extremism is seen another main threat facing
Turkey by Turkish policymakers. While terrorists, failing states and organized crime
organizations are the agencies of these threats to the EU, terrorist organization and unstable states
and regions are the main agencies of the threats facing Turkey. The main target of threats is civil
society in the EU, transport, energy and information system and economic interests of the EU.
The threats have mainly targeted the integrity of the Turkish Republic, its civilian population,
major cities and critical military-civil infrastructures. Finally, the Middle East, the Caucasus and
the Balkans are the common geographical sources of the threats facing both the EU and Turkey.
In addition, various regions of Asia and Africa are the other geographical sources of the threats to
the EU.

**Table-10:** Security threat perceptions of the EU and Turkey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>EUROPEAN UNION</strong></th>
<th><strong>TURKEY</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of key Threats</strong></td>
<td>Terrorism, Proliferation of WMD, Regional Conflicts, State Failure, Organized Crimes</td>
<td>Terrorism, Regional Conflicts, Long-Range Missiles and WMD, Religious Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agency of Threats</strong></td>
<td>Terrorists, Rogue/Failing States, Organized Crime organizations</td>
<td>Terrorist organizations, unstable states-regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target of Threats</strong></td>
<td>Civil Society, Economic Interests, Transport, Energy, Information</td>
<td>Integrity of state, civilian population, major cities and critical military-civil infrastructures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographical source of Threats</strong></td>
<td>Middle East, Asia (Kashmir, Korean Peninsula), Africa, Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Middle East (especially Iraq), the Caucasus and the Balkans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: For European Union; the ESS, and Kirchner&Sperling, Global Security Governance, 2007a, p.119.
For Turkey, data from official government documents, and academic views as analysed in chapter 3.
- Public Security Threat Perceptions:

Table-11 shows the threat perceptions of the public in eleven EU member states, in EU’s four large member states, and in Turkey in 2007. Firstly, ‘Global warming’ is perceived as a gravest threat both in Turkey and in the EU. ‘The effect of global warming, energy dependence and migration’, respectively, are perceived as the main three threats by Europeans, whereas Turkish people believe that ‘the effect of global warming, a major economic downtown and international terrorism’ are the main threats against Turkey. It could be argued that ‘global warming and global spread of a disease as avian flu’ is perceived a little much more than expected, since Turkey experienced draught and dehydration in the summer of 2007, and fatal avian flu disease in 2005. For example, according to the survey conducted by Transatlantic Trends in 2005, 67 per cent of the respondents perceived global warming as a threat in Turkey.

According to the survey, ‘Islamic fundamentalism and global spread of a disease’ are seen the least threat by Europeans, whereas ‘Islamic Fundamentalism and migration to Europe’ are thought as the less threats by Turks.

The per cent of respondents who perceive Islamic fundamentalism, global warming and Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as the threat are nearly same in Turkey and in the EU. However, there are huge differences between Turkey and the EU in terms of migration, global spread of disease and a major economic downtown. While global spread of disease and a major economic downtown are much high in Turkey, migration is pretty high in the EU. It could be said that occurrences of the macroeconomic crises and bird flu events in Turkey recently are the main reason why Turkish people perceive these as the main threats. On the other hand, illegal migration, human trafficking and refugee issues are highly problematic for the Europeans.
When the global threats perceptions of Turkey are compared with those of the great states of the EU, it can be seen huge gap between Turkey and four member states of the EU. Generally the threat perceptions of the two societies are similar regarding ‘global warming and nuclear weapon’, whereas the others are rather different. Nevertheless, there are also great differences among the four European states; for instance, while in terms of ‘international terrorism’, the UK is quite different from the others, the French think quite different from the others regarding ‘large numbers of immigrant-refugees into Europe’ (Table-11).

**Table-11:** Public security threat perceptions of the EU and Turkey in 2007 (per cent):

Question: In the next 10 years, please tell me how likely you are to be personally affected by each of the following threats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>EU11</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>the UK</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Terrorism</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large numbers of immigrant-refugees into Europe</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran acquiring nuclear weapons</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The global spread of a disease as avian flu</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy dependence</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A major economic downtown</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The effect of global warming</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic fundamentalism</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: German Marshall Fund of the USA, Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2007. (EU11 includes France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Poland, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. All these states are also member of the NATO).

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24 The survey was conducted between 04/06/2007 and 23/06/2007 in above countries.
4.3. Comparison between the EU and Turkey in terms of Responses to Threats

The ESS supports an active multilateral policy through cooperation with other global players and institutions and extremely gives priority much more soft power tools than hard power tools. Turkey has actively engaged international peacekeeping operations and made efforts to ensure stability in its region by cooperating with the international organizations and other states since 2000s.

4.3.1. Interaction Preferences

The philosophy of the EU is based on ‘the multilateralism concept’ (Kirchner, 2007b:120), when the EU first established in 1950s. The founders of the EU believed that acting together could ensure more stability and peace in Europe after the two devastating wars. Therefore, the European countries have tried to establish political and defence cooperation or institutions such as the WEU, the EPC and the CFSP, and developed a security policy based on multinational and multidimensional approach. They try to refrain to pursue unilateral policy based on national interest. In this context, policymakers of the EU claim that the current complex threats could be coped with by acting together. The ESS frequently refers to multilateral approaches to security and highlights that ‘no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own’ (ESS:2). It defends ‘an effective multilateral system’ by aiming ‘a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’ (ESS:10). ‘An international order-based on effective multilateralism’ (ESS:9) would ensure more security and prosperity in the world.

Similarly, the Turkish government believes that international cooperation and multilateralism are the only way to response the new security threats which are the multidimensional not a state or army. According to the Defence Minister, ‘Turkey has given importance to develop multilateral and bilateral relationship with its neighbours to ensure peace and stability in the region. Thus, it
has aimed in its national security policy; ‘to be a security provider country, to be a power and balance component in its region and ensure cooperation, constructive relation with its neighbours’ (Defence Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2004:2). Therefore, Turkey did pioneer and participate in a number of multilateral security projects and regional cooperation such as the ‘Middle East Multilateral Peace Process’ (Makovsky & Sayari, 2000:3), ‘the South East Europe Multinational Peace Force, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Blackseafort’ (Akcapar, 2007:86-93).

The EU is against unilateral policy that is why it did not support the US invasion in Iraq. Turkey has preferred to adopt a multilateral stance on the Iraq issue and adopted more EU-oriented policies. It did not support US’s unilateralist and coercive approach towards Saddam’s regime in Iraq. Therefore, it did not allow to the US army to invasion of Iraq by using Turkish border. ‘Many European countries met positively the Turkish parliament’s refusal in 2003 to allow the US to use Turkish territory to open a northern front for its intervention in Iraq’ (Kirisci, 2006:25).

Furthermore, it could be evaluated that particularly new Cyprus policy of Turkey shows clearly it’s multilateral and compromise approach to solve the problem. Turkey, known generally as a hard liner in Cyprus issue, claimed to ‘annex Northern Cyprus to Turkey’ (Eralp, 2000:182) before the Helsinki Decision. However, in 2004, it supported explicitly the UN’s plan for the reunification of the island and the Turkish Cypriots voted for the plan, whereas the Greek Cypriots voted against it.

Although Turkey has a multilateral stance on the international issues, it has continued to pursue a unilateral approach towards the PKK. Turkey launched unilaterally several cross-border operations in response to PKK in Northern Iraq. To prevent the negative international reaction, the Turkish government had pursued a close diplomacy by setting several meetings with the Iraqi government, the US and the EU, before the cross-border operation started. Furthermore, the US,
"strategic partner" of Turkey, provided logistical, technical and political support to Turkey in the cross-border operations.

The EU acknowledges that only in cooperation with other states and international institutions will it be able to ward off the threats it faces (Kirchner, 2007b:130). Hence, it values to the bilateral cooperation with the US by declaring that ‘the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable’ (ESS:13). In addition, it states that it is necessary to ‘work for closer relations with Russia’ and ‘develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India’ (ESS:14).

Since Turkey is a middle size and regional power, it generally attempts to develop bilateral relationship with its immediate neighbours. The Turkish government started regular high-level meetings with the government of the neighbouring countries to implement its security and foreign policy called ‘zero-problems with neighbours’ (Kirisici, 2006:51). Besides, Turkey has always seen a strong tie, called ‘strategic cooperation’ (Akcapar, 2007:145) to USA as an important component of its security. The US has been one of ‘Turkey’s strongest allies since the Cold War’ (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003:68).

The ESS states that the EU should be ‘more active, more coherent and more capable’ (ESS:11) to counter the new dynamic threats. The EU emphasizes the active policy including crisis management, conflict prevention and military forces in order to prevent threats as soon as possible: ‘We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’ (ESS:11).

The Turkish policymakers believe that Turkey needs to pursue active policy to response threats facing it, due to the fact that it is at the centre of the volatile regions. The Prime Minister Erdoğan states that ‘Turkey should to pursue a pro-active foreign policy aimed at contributing to regional and global peace and security’ (cited in Akcapar, 2007:82).
4.3.2. Institutional Preferences

According to the ESS, ‘a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’ (ESS:11) should be developed for an effective multilateral system. In this context, special importance is attached to the United Nations and the Security Council. ‘The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ (ESS:9). Europe should attempt to strengthen and equip the UN in order to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively. ‘The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security’ (ESS:11).

For the ESS, there are also other institutions, which contribute international peace and security. The WTO and the IMF are seen the ‘key institutions in the international system’ (ESS:9) and should be supported by the EU to ‘widen the membership of such bodies (ESS:9). On the other hand, the NATO is perceived as an important institution in terms of transatlantic relations. The ESS highlights to EU–NATO permanent arrangements and, in particular, the Berlin Plus arrangements as a means of ‘enhancing the operational capability of the EU and providing the framework for strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management’ (ESS:12). In addition, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union are defined as the regional organizations which ensure ‘global governance’ (ESS:9).

The EU also sees itself as an important ‘global player’ (ESS:1), since it is ‘a Union of 25 states, with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s gross national product’ (ESS:1). That is why it should share its ‘responsibility for global security and in building a better world’ (ESS:1) in international security system. It established the CFSP and ESDP to ensure its own common security policies and to contribute international stability and peace. It is believed that
‘the increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor’ (ESS:1) in international political system.

Nonetheless, although the EU attempts to create common security tools through the CFSP and ESDP, there are still different institutional preferences particularly among the large member states. While France and Germany perceive the EU as a best institution to meet current security threats, the UK emphasizes strong transatlantic ties and the special position of the UN, and claims that NATO and UN are more significant than the EU to meet its security threats. On the other hand, Italy does not have such a clear preference among these institutions (Kirchner, 2007b:122).

It could be said that Turkey’s institutional preferences are mainly converging with the EU. Turkey is a member of several international institutions such as NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the UN, the WTO and IMF. These institutions are the most important international organizations, which ensure security against threats facing Turkey. Particularly, the Turkish government perceives the NATO as the most important institution to meet threats of Turkey since the Cold War era. Besides, Turkey, founding member of the UN, has actively supported and engaged the UN’s international peacekeeping operations. Turkey believes that regional and global conflicts can be solved with the contributions of these institutions. Finally, Turkey also wishes to have full integration with the security, and defence structure of the EU. Turkish Defence Ministry emphasizes that ‘it has strategically importance and priority for Turkey to be part of European CSDP’ (Defence Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2004:4).

4.3.3. Instrumental Preferences

There are some differences with regard to instrumental preferences among the EU’s four great states. France and the UK have nuclear weapons and both of them still heavily rely on their nuclear weapons as deterrence against the enemies from the outside. On the other hand, Germany is basically a strong supporter for the civilian operations, whereas Italy wants to implement both
soft and hard powers against the threats. In summary, all four leading members of the EU share the idea of an integrated approach against the threats the EU faces (Kirchner, 2007b:122).

The ESS states that a mixture of instruments is necessary to struggle against the complex and dynamic threats. In responses to the threats, primary choice of the EU is predominantly ‘soft power’ rather than ‘hard power’. Hence, the EU has used the intelligence, police operations, economic and financial assistances, development and humanitarian aids, judicial measures, civilian crisis management and military operations as a last choice. The EU claims that creating a better world could prevent the threats. In order to create a better world, it promotes democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance and supports the social and political reforms in all over the world.

‘The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order’ (ESS:10).

These soft power tools incorporate development, special trade cooperation and other assistance programmes. The EU and its member states have cooperated with the whole regions in the world since the early 1960s, and supported them actively through soft power instruments, in particular African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (Kirchner, 2007b:122).

When analysing Turkey, it could be claimed that the security policy of Turkey has begun to change from the ‘hard power’ to ‘soft power’ to deal with the security challenges since 2000. The Turkish governments traditionally perceived the ‘military power’ as the most important tool against the threats at past. However, this security approach has been gradually abandoned and its security policy has launched to become much more open to cooperation, dialogue and to the notion of searching for ‘win-win outcomes’ (Kirisci, 2006:14) to international conflicts since the accession of Turkey as a candidate for the EU membership in 1999. Turkey’s new security
approach gives primacy to the ‘peaceful resolution of the disagreements in accordance with the
diplomatic, economic and other crisis management measures, but also tasks the Turkish armed
forces to be ready to contribute to reducing tension, prevent tension from transforming into armed
conflicts and containing the aggressor’ (Akcapar, 2007:71). The new Cyprus Policy, its mediator
role between Palestine-Israeli, Azerbaijan-Armenia and good neighbourhood policy particularly
with Greece and Syria are a few examples of Turkish new approaches.

The Turkish authorities have realized the importance and efficiency of soft power in struggling
threats. It can be examined several examples of its soft power policies in both domestic and
international issues. ‘In 2002, the National Security Council advocated the importance of
promoting economic and commercial relations with all neighbouring countries to promote peace
and security rather than solely emphasise military measures’ (Kirisci, 2006:37). In addition to
military measures, for instance, the Turkish governments made several reforms in Turkish Penal
Code, and announced and implemented economic-social programs in the southern Turkey to
prevent the PKK activities. In international area, ‘not only Turkey participated peacekeeping
operations in Bosnia, but also it provided financial, economic and humanitarian assistance,
trained the new Federation’s and contributed institutional assistance in education, construction
and judiciary’ (Kut, 2000:84).

The EU believes that if the main political instruments of the EU fail to prevent the conflicts,
military operation should be developed as a last chance. The ESS states that ‘when necessary,
robust intervention’ (ESS:11) should be developed as an instrument to deal with the key threats.
As it is stated in the ESS, the EU and member states have intervened to prevent regional conflicts
and to put failed states back on their feet such as in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. The ESS refers explicitly to the use of military force only in the case of failed
states, where it is acknowledged that ‘military assets and effective policing may be needed in the
post conflict phase’ (ESS:7) as well as the possible need for military instruments to restore order in failed states.

The EUFOR and the ‘Operation Artemis’ are two examples of the EU military intervention to prevent the conflicts. The ‘Operation Artemis’ is a deployment of EU-led forces in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is politically important EU operations, since it opened the way for the EU to become an actor in Central Africa. The EUFOR emerged as the replacement of NATO’s operation, SFOR, in Bosnia, in December 2004. It is a peacekeeping operation and supports the other peace-building measures in the Western Balkans region including Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia (Kirchner, 2007b:124).

Turkish policymakers argue that relative importance of hard and soft power depends on the issue. Although, they believe the importance of soft power such as economic and diplomatic instruments, when necessary they used the military measures as an ‘ultima ratio’ against the security threats. For instance, Turkey launched cross-border military operations in northern Iraq against the PKK targets, in 2007 and 2008.

Furthermore, Turkey has actively supported several peacekeeping operations led by UN, NATO, OSCE and EU missions. Turkey participated fully EU-led operations, such as ‘EU Police Mission in Bosnia, Concordia Operation in Macedonia, Proxima Police Mission in Macedonia, Artemis Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Althea Operation in Bosnia’ (Muftuler-Bac, 2007:18). It has also provided financial and development aids to contribute the reconstruction projects such as in Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan. In this context, ‘Turkey continues to contribute to EU-led military EUFOR operation ALTHEA. Turkey also assists EU-led police missions EUPM-II in Bosnia-Herzegovina and EUPOL KINSHASA in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (The Commission, Turkey 2007 Progress Report, 2007:74).
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), another policy of the EU, aims to ensure stability and security by using soft power instruments to the countries surrounding the EU. It also aims to support efforts to realise the objectives of the European Security Strategy. ‘It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation’ (ENP:3). The ENP is applied to the EU’s immediate neighbours by land or sea: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Kirchner highlights the role of ENP in struggling against the threats:

“The EU intends both to prevent those countries from becoming hotspots of instability but also to guard itself against the spread of organized crime and exploding population growth. The EU implements its ENP policy by using financial aids, trade agreements, democratisation measures and political dialogue as the main instruments. Association Agreements and Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans are also part of this policy” (Kirchner, 2007b:124)

The Turkish government has traditionally supported the EU’s constructive engagement policy in the Balkans, Caucasus, Mediterranean and Middle East. Since majority of the countries, under the umbrella of EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, are immediate neighbour of Turkey, the Turkish authorities believe that the ENP would contribute stability and peace in the regions where are close related to security of Turkey. Therefore, the ENP is strongly concerned with Turkey’s security interests. Turkey’s participation in the UN force in Lebanon is in accordance with the ‘aims of the EU Neighbourhood Policy’ (Muftuler-Bac, 2007:21). In addition, both the EU and Turkey have pursued the ‘policy of dialogue’ (Kirisci, 2006:86) regarding the Iran issue, Arab-Israel conflict and the Caucasus problem.

Table-12 demonstrates the policy preferences of the EU and Turkey. In terms of interaction preferences, the EU has predominantly pursued multilateral approach in response to the threats.
Nonetheless, Turkey’s policy preference depends on the situation; it has pursued a combination of bilateral and multilateral, and if necessary unilateral responses to the security threats. The EU and Turkey believe the importance of the UN, NATO, WTO and the EU in responses to the threats. The EU also highlights the importance of the regional institutions such as the OSCE and ASEAN in order to provide and protect international peace and security. Turkey gives special priority to the IMF and WTO, in particular, in an economic crisis. The EU emerges as a soft power regional organization; thus, it has predominantly pursued a soft power tools such as diplomatic solution, economic-development and humanitarian aids in response to the threats. In addition, the EU-led operations, such as EUFOR and Operation Artemis, are used as instrumental preferences by the EU to provide international peace and security. Turkey has used a combination of military and civilian tools; on the one hand, it has pursued diplomacy and provided economic and development aids, on the other hand, it has participated international peacekeeping operations and launched cross-border military operations.

**Table-12:** EU and Turkey’s preferred responses to threats:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EUROPEAN UNION</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction Preferences</strong></td>
<td>Predominantly multilateral responses</td>
<td>Combination of bilateral and multilateral responses, (if necessary) unilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Preferences</strong></td>
<td>Mainly EU institutions; UN, WTO, NATO and regional organizations such as OSCE and ASEAN</td>
<td>NATO, UN, EU and IMF-WTO (in economic instability)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental Preferences</strong></td>
<td>Diplomatic, economic and development aid and military operations</td>
<td>Combination of civilian and military tools; diplomacy; peace operations; economic and development aid, cross-border military operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: For European Union threats; the ESS, Kirchner & Sperling, Global Security Governance, 2007a, p.123. For Turkey; official government documents and academic views as analysed in chapter 3.
4.3.4. Public Opinion’s Policy Preferences

The public opinion surveys provide a data in order to make comparison between the Turks and Europeans. Public opinion surveys show that there is a clear harmony between the EU’s policymakers and its public opinion regarding the responses to the security threats. It could be stated that majority of the Europeans generally adopt and support the instruments and policies explained by the ESS. However, there are a number of disparities between the Turks and Europeans in term of responses to the security threats.

Table-13 obviously demonstrates the gap between the Turks and Europeans in terms of security identity. To survey conducted by the Transatlantic Trends in 2007, 88 per cent of the respondents’ feel that the EU should take greater responsibility for dealing with the international threats. While 95 per cent of the Italians, the highest, believe the necessity of the EU’s more responsibility in order to respond to the threats, 85 per cent of the British does; the lowest among the four states. However, 39 per cent of the Turks support that the European Union should take greater responsibility for dealing with the main international threats.

On function of the NATO, there is an also considerable gap between the Turks and the Europeans. 37 per cent of the Turkish people believe that NATO is still essential to Turkey's security, whereas 55 per cent of the Europeans believe it is an important institution for the EU’s security. Among the four states, the Britons who believe the importance of NATO on security issues are the top rank.

Regarding the role of EU as a soft power, 71 per cent of the EU’s public thinks that it should be the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries, but only 26 per cent of the Turks believe that the EU should have a role to help establish democracy in other countries.
As instrumental preferences, majority of the both societies believe that the soft power is more important than hard power in international issues. Nevertheless there is a gap between the Turks and the Europeans; 85 percent of the Europeans agree that economic power is more important in world affairs than military power, whereas 72 per cent of the Turkish people do agree.

Related to interaction preferences, the Turkish society is in the midst of the multilateral and unilateral responses, since 47 per cent of the people agree that when Turkey acts on a national security issue, it is critical that Turkey does cooperate with its allies. On the other hand, the Europeans support much more multilateral approach; 85 per cent of the Europeans think that they should act with their allies on their national security issues (Table-13).

**Table-13: Public perceptions of the EU and Turkey on responses:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU-11</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>the UK</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU greater responsibility for dealing with the threats</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO is essential to the security of country</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of EU to help establish democracy</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power is more important than military power</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with the closest allies in national security issue</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: German Marshall Fund of the USA, Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2007.

The Table-13 presents that, in general, there is a common security identity in dealing with the threats among the Europeans, although there are slightly differences among the leading member states of the EU. However, there are considerably disparities between the two societies, the Turks
and the Europeans, on interaction, institutional and instrumental preferences. Turkish society considers quite differently from the Europeans about responses to the threats. There are many reasons of these disparities:

Firstly, Turkey is a candidate but not a member state of the EU. Therefore the Turkish people do not feel themselves as a union citizen or a member of the EU. They do not have European identity. Although majority of Turks wish to be a member of the EU, they still do perceive the EU as the ‘other’.

Secondly, although accession negotiation process started in 2005, the people believe that Turkey will not be a full membership of the EU because of its double standard. Many Turks usually consider that while the EU demands some criteria for Turkey, it never claims these criteria for other candidate states. Open-ended accession negotiations with Turkey, referendum clause for Turkey’s membership and proposal of the privileged partnership instead of full membership by some member states are a few examples of exceptional conditions for Turkey. While Turkey, applied for associate membership in 1959, could not be a member of the EU, the Central and Eastern European states, which had just emerged from the 45 years of communist rule, applied for membership in 1990s, currently are member of the EU. ‘There are still EU governments who declare that even if Turkey meets all the accession criteria, they would still oppose Turkey’s accession’ (Muftuler-Bac, 2007:32). Therefore, there is a common belief among the Turks that Turkey cannot be a member of the EU whatever it does.

Third, due to discourse of some EU’s politicians, it has been considered that the EU is a Christian club. ‘Many Turks believe that the EU’s policy towards Turkey is unfair and reflects an inherent bias against Turkey because of its religion and cultural diversities’ (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003:51).

Fourth, the Turkish people have suffered great casualties because of the PKK activities. Political and economic supports to the PKK, tacitly or deliberately by the some EU’s states have caused a
suspicious, displeasure and lost credibility about the EU among Turkish people. Turkish public opinion considers the EU’s policy towards this issue as ‘attempts to interfere in Turkish domestic politics, to weaken Turkey from within, and to eventually divide Turkey into parts and create independent states in the region’ (Gozen, 2003:60).

Fifth, when Turkey usually could not be supported related to struggling against its major threat, the PKK, by its allies, it is believed that Turkey must cope with the threats unilaterally. It has been perceived, particularly, by nationalist environments that ‘Turkey is the most lonely country in the world and that the country is surrounded by the largest number of internal and external enemies in the world’ (Kirisci, 2006:33).

Another survey conducted by Eurobarometer\textsuperscript{25} in 2007, shows the results of the opinions of the EU’s and Turkey’s publics about the EU’s image and the CFSP-ESDP. The survey results have overlapped with the survey conducted by Transatlantic Trends. There is a considerable gap about the level of support for the CFSP and ESDP between the EU and Turkey. Support for a common foreign policy is 72\% in the EU, whereas it is 40\% in Turkey. On the ESDP, less than half (46\%) of the Turks support the policy, whereas majority of the Europeans (77\%) support the common security and defence policy (Eurobarometer 67, 2007:147, 149).

Nonetheless, results are rather confusing regarding the image of the EU. Both societies nearly agree same level on positive image of EU. 53 per cent of respondents in Turkey consider that the European Union has a positive image, whereas 52 per cent the Europeans think about the EU positively. The EU’s image is significantly low in the UK, whereas it is highest in Italy. The EU’s positive image is 46\% in France, 52\% in Germany, 35\% in the UK and 58\% in Italy (Eurobarometer 67, 2007:107).

\textsuperscript{25} The standard Eurobarometer was carried out between 10 April and 15 May 2007.
4.4. Allocation of Resources

Size of military force-military expenditures, and development assistance-humanitarian aids can give an opinion about a state’s security policy. More defence budget means using more hard power tools. Thus, military expenditures-size of military forces of Turkey and four EU member states and their development aids to the poor states provide a comparison about their policy preferences.

The military expenditures of France, Germany, the UK, Italy, the EU-4 and Turkey are shown at Table-14. After the 11 September era, there has been a drastically rise in the EU’s expenditures between 2001 and 2004; from US$ 173 billion in 2001 to US$ 188 billion in 2004. This increase mostly emanates from the UK’s military expenditures, which have increased significantly from US$ 48.8 billion in 2001 to US$ 60.2 billion in 2004. At this period, while there is a slightly increase in France’s expenditures; Germany’s expenditures have dropped and Italy’s expenditures have nearly stayed same level. Nevertheless, in 2005, there is a more or less decrease all these countries, thus, in the EU. In contrast to the EU, there has been gradually decrease in Turkey’s military expenditures since 2000. Decrease of the PKK’s activities after the capture of its leader in 1999 is main reason in drop of Turkey’s military expenditures.

When comparing the military expenditures in terms of percent of GDP, it would be realized that there is a great gap between Turkey and the EU. The total percentage of military expenditure of the GDP of four EU members remained nearly same level between 2000 and 2005 at interval of 2.1 and 2.2 per cent, whereas Turkey’s expenditure as percentage of GDP is highly much more than 2.1 at the same period. However, there has been gradually decrease in Turkey’s military expenditures since 2000. It dropped from 5.0 per cent to 2.8 percent, in between 2000 and 2005 (Table-14). It can be derived from the Table-13 that if extraordinary event does not emerge
regarding the Turkish security perception and situation, its defence budget will decrease, and its military expenditure, in terms of GDP, can come to close that of the EU.

Table-14: Military Expenditures of the leading member states of the EU and Turkey in 2000-2005 (-in constant 2005- US$ billion and as percentage of GDP):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50.4 (2.5)</td>
<td>50.2 (2.5)</td>
<td>51.3 (2.5)</td>
<td>52.6 (2.6)</td>
<td>54.0 (2.6)</td>
<td>53.0 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>41.1 (1.5)</td>
<td>40.5 (1.5)</td>
<td>40.7 (1.5)</td>
<td>40.0 (1.4)</td>
<td>38.9 (1.4)</td>
<td>38.0 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>47.8 (2.4)</td>
<td>48.8 (2.4)</td>
<td>50.9 (2.5)</td>
<td>57.5 (2.7)</td>
<td>60.2 (2.7)</td>
<td>60.0 (2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>34.1 (2.0)</td>
<td>33.6 (2.0)</td>
<td>34.5 (2.0)</td>
<td>34.8 (2.0)</td>
<td>34.9 (2.0)</td>
<td>33.5 (1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-4</td>
<td>173.4 (2.1)</td>
<td>173.0 (2.1)</td>
<td>177.3 (2.1)</td>
<td>184.9 (2.2)</td>
<td>188.0 (2.2)</td>
<td>184.6 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>15.3 (5.0)</td>
<td>14.5 (5.0)</td>
<td>13.3 (4.4)</td>
<td>11.9 (3.8)</td>
<td>10.8 (3.1)</td>
<td>10.3 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On the other hand, in terms of GDP, military expenditures of Germany and Italy are clearly less than those of France and the UK; for example, Germany spent 1.4 per cent of its GDP, whereas the UK allocated 2.7 per cent of its GDP in 2005. The UK, one of the main supporters of the US’s invasion in Iraq, has deployed thousands of solders in Iraq since 2003. This is main reason why it has relatively high military expenditures. It military expenditures/GDP increased from 2.5 per cent in 2002 to 2.7 per cent in 2003. In addition, Table-14 shows that there is a slightly gap between military expenditures of Turkey and the UK in terms of GDP.

Table-15 concludes that size of the Turkish Military Force is much higher than those of EU’s members. There is a great drop in between 2000 and 2003, and there has been slightly decrease
since 2003 in Turkish Armed Forces. Nevertheless, Turkey has still got too many soldiers comparison to EU’ member states in terms of size of military forces, and military-civilian personnel as percentage of labour force. Among the four countries, France is the first rank in terms of number of military forces. However, it has also less military force than that of Turkey. Compulsory military service and high young population in Turkey are the main reasons why number of Turkish military forces is significantly high. According to the rules in Turkey, every male of Turkish citizen has to serve in the military forces for a certain period depending on education level.

**Table-15:** Armed Forces of the leading member states of the EU and Turkey in 1995-2007 (military -thousand- and military and civilian personnel as percentage of labour force):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>502 (2.3)</td>
<td>394 (1.8)</td>
<td>356 (1.6)</td>
<td>357 (1.6)</td>
<td>357 (1.6)</td>
<td>356 (1.6)</td>
<td>354 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>352 (1.3)</td>
<td>314 (1.0)</td>
<td>271 (0.8)</td>
<td>252 (0.7)</td>
<td>246 (0.7)</td>
<td>245 (0.7)</td>
<td>247 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td>233 (1.3)</td>
<td>218 (1.1)</td>
<td>206 (1.1)</td>
<td>208 (1.1)</td>
<td>201 (1.0)</td>
<td>196 (1.0)</td>
<td>190 (0.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>435 (2.2)</td>
<td>381 (1.8)</td>
<td>325 (1.5)</td>
<td>315 (1.5)</td>
<td>314 (1.5)</td>
<td>309 (1.4)</td>
<td>298 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>805 (3.8)</td>
<td>793 (3.6)</td>
<td>534 (2.5)</td>
<td>502 (2.3)</td>
<td>501 (2.3)</td>
<td>499 (2.2)</td>
<td>496 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The ESS emphasizes the importance of ‘soft power’ instruments in order to deal with the threats. Development assistance and humanitarian aids are the significant tools of the soft power, which is the most important policy preference of the EU in response to the threats. The EU is the largest
in the world not only contributor to the UN’s peacekeeping budget and Official Development Assistance (ODA) but also provider of humanitarian aid (Kirchner, 2007b:128).

There is a large gap between Turkey and the EU in terms of both quantities the ODA and per cent of GNI (Table-16). The EU-15 contributed US$ 59 billion, whereas Turkey provided US$ 0.7 billion in 2006. There is a slightly increase in both of them in 2006. In terms of both ODA and percent of ODA/GNI, the UK is the largest provider country of the EU.

Nevertheless, the EU-15, including member states previous 2004 Enlargement round, are the richest member states of the EU. When comparing to the EU’s new member states, it would be seen that, the contribution of Turkey is higher than Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic in terms of both ODA and per cent of ODA/GNI. For example, while ‘per cent of ODA/GNI of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic are 0.13, 0.9, 0.12, and 0.10 respectively; it is 0.18 in Turkey in 2006. In addition, the figure is also higher than Greece (0.17 per cent) in 2006’ (OECD, Development Assistance Committee, 2007:8). Therefore, it can be stated that Turkey has considerable contributed financial aids to the UN peacekeeping operations and reconstruction activities according to its size and economic power.

Table-16: Official Development Assistance (ODA) of the EU and Turkey in 2005 and 2006:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ODA US$</td>
<td>ODA/GNI (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>billion (current)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10,0</td>
<td>0,47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10,1</td>
<td>0,36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>10,8</td>
<td>0,47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5,1</td>
<td>0,29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>55,6</td>
<td>0,44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the humanitarian aid, while Turkey’s voluntary contribution to the international organizations about in US $ 18 million and Turkey's humanitarian assistance through the international organizations just over US $ 10 million in 2006 (Turkish MFA, 2007), the EU, which has a reputation as a ‘civilian superpower’ (Dover, 2007:239), spends on average euro 604 million (approximately US$ 900 million) per year which is 30 per cent of global humanitarian aid (Kirchner, 2007b:128-129).

4.5. Security Relationship between Turkey and the EU

There has been a close security relationship between Turkey and Europe since the Second World War. Turkey incorporated into the Western Security system by NATO membership in 1952. Turkey and Western Europe mutually contributed their securities through NATO against the Soviet Union and communism threats during the Cold War era. Turkey’s national security was strongly depending on Western allies through NATO membership, and it ‘was a reliable NATO ally for the European states and also was the main security provider in the Eastern Mediterranean during the Cold War’ (Muftuler-Bac, 2007:17). Furthermore, Turkey is also a member of the Council of Europe, the OSCE and an association member of the WEU. It applied for the membership of the EU, called the European Community (EC) at that time, in 1959 and signed an Association Agreement (the Ankara Agreement) with the EC in 1963. According to this agreement, if Turkey could meet the conditions, it would be full membership of the EU.

Nevertheless, there are some disagreements related to security matters between the EU and Turkey. Turkey’s application for EU membership, Turkish-Greek relations and the Cyprus Issue, ESDP-NATO relations and the approach of the EU towards the PKK have been the main disputes between the EU and Turkey since the end of Cold War.

At the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, ‘Turkey’s exclusion from the group of countries with which the EU proposed to start accession negotiations caused a tension between the EU and Turkey.
Turkey decided to suspend its political dialogue with the EU’ (Kramer, 2000:194-198). However, at the Helsinki summit of 1999, the EU accepted Turkey as a candidate member on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate countries. Eralp claims that, ‘from the EU’s standpoint, geopolitical and security considerations were probably among the most important factors in its decision to affirm Turkey’s candidacy’ (Eralp, 2000:185). Finally, the accession negotiations with Turkey initiated on 3 October 2005.

Turkey was also deeply disappointed by the decision of the EU to include Cyprus as a candidate with whom accession negotiations should be opened early. Turkish policymakers thought the decision would result in a de facto partition of the island. Turkey claimed that ‘membership of Cyprus was unconstitutional and illegal under the Zurich-London agreements, which do not allow any union of Cyprus and another state’ (Kramer, 2000:176). Turkey hardened its own position on the Cyprus problem, emphasizing that ‘Cyprus is a primary security concern and claiming its threat to take step toward further integration between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC)26 (Eralp, 2000:182). After the intervention27 of Turkey on Cyprus Island in 1974, Turkey policy towards the Cyprus was alleged as unilateralist and policy of no compromise by the international communities and Turkey was seen the main obstacle in the process of solution. Nevertheless, after the Helsinki Decision, Turkey stance on the issue changed and it supported the UN plan. The island was not united due to the Greek Cypriots, since while ‘majority of the Turkish Cypriots (76 per cent) approved the UN plan for the unification of the island in the referendum in 2004; majority of the Greek Cypriots (75 per cent) rejected the Plan’ (Bahceli, 2006: 171). However, the Greek Cypriot side was unilaterally accepted as a member of the EU in 2004. Thus, the Cyprus issue has been a problem between Turkey and the EU since the

26 ‘The TRNC is officially recognized only by Turkey, and is both economically and politically dependent upon Turkey’ (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003:78).
27 ‘After consultations with Britain, which did not want to take joint action under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey intervened as a guarantor power on 20 July 1974 in conformity with its treaty rights and obligations. The Turkish intervention blocked the way to the annexation of the island by Greece, stopped the persecution of the Turkish Cypriots and brought peace to Cyprus. However, the Turkey’s western allies as well as rest of the world criticized Turkish intervention and Turkey was punished with embargo by US’ (Bagci & Bal, 2002:16).
membership of Cyprus. The EU has not recognized the TRNC as an independent country and has officially used economic sanctions and political isolation tools against the Turkish Cypriots since the division of the island through Turkish intervention in 1974.

Turkey and the EU also experienced an argument in terms of relationship between the ESDP and NATO. The EU, beginning to move toward creating its own rapid reaction force, wanted to use certain NATO facilities in peacekeeping operations. However, Turkey as a member of NATO blocked the NATO-EU deal by using its veto right. Turkey, which always supports the EU-led operations and attempts to be part of EU CSDP, is not directly opposed to the development of the EU’s role in security and defence policies. It wanted to be involving in the planning and decision-making in the EU crisis management operations, especially if an operation is directly related to its own security interest. Therefore, it did not approve the EU project, which can use automatically NATO assets to manage a crisis in which NATO decides not to become involved. There were two main concerns of its objection. ‘First, Turkey feared that Greece might use its membership in the EU to push the EU to intervene in areas that directly affect Turkey’s security. For example, the EU might use such a force in Cyprus or the Aegean conflicts. Second, most of the crises that the EU and NATO might face in the future are likely to be on or near Turkey’s periphery. Thus, it wanted to assure that it would be involved in decisions that directly affected its security’ (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003:65-66).

In December 2001, Turkey accepted an American-British sponsored compromise proposal called the Ankara Document. ‘The Document not only provided assurances that the ESDP would not be used against other NATO allies (so Turkey), but also guaranteed that Turkey would be closely consulted in the case of an intervention by the EU in any contingency in the geographic vicinity of Turkey or that affected Turkish security interests’ (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003:66). Thus, the

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28 While Turkey, Norway and Iceland are the non-EU European members of NATO, Sweden, Austria, Finland and Ireland are non-NATO EU member states.
Document would ensure two main concerns of Turkey. However, although all other member states approved the Ankara Document, ‘Greece declared that it did not accept the Ankara comprise’ (Turker, 2007:190). Finally, in December 2002, Turkey abolished its veto on EU cooperation with NATO in return for a commitment that Cyprus, even if it unifies, would remain outside the regional security structure. Turkey has still continued to ‘object to the inclusion of Cyprus in the EU-NATO security cooperation’ (The European Commission, Turkey 2007 Progress Report, 2007:74).

The PKK issue has also caused disputes between the EU and Turkey. While the EU believes that the issue should be solved by using soft power tools and more democratic methods and it generally criticises Turkey’s military operations to the PKK, Turkey claims that some EU member states have supported the PKK. Turkey experienced a number of crises with several EU member states such as Holland, Belgium, Italy, Germany, France, Denmark and Greece due to their direct or indirect support to the PKK. The Turkish public and politicians are especially disappointed with some of the EU’s member states handling of the PKK. A meeting of the so-called Kurdish parliament in exile, in Italy, hidden of its leader by Italy and Greece, broadcasting of its television in Denmark are a few examples of these supports.

Turkey has taken several steps to address the issue in its relations with the EU. In between 2001 and 2003, the Turkish Parliament passed a series of reforms, such as ‘lifting the ban of Kurdish and other languages broadcasts, increasing civilian representation on the National Security Council, adopting a new civil code, amendments in the penal code and anti-terrorism law, lifting the death penalty and permission instruction in language other than Turkish to be legal’ (Altunisik & Tur, 2005: 120-121). Furthermore, Turkey made other important reforms related to the issue. These are: ‘acceptance of re-trial based on the European Court of Human Rights judgments the enactment of the Law on Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts; the ratification of the two main human rights covenants of the United Nations; and the abolition
of the death penalty and of anti-democratic provisions of the Law on the Fight against Terrorism’ (Erdoğan, 2007:36).

Although there are a number of disputes between Turkey and the EU, the security relationship of the two parties is close together. Turkey generally shares the same security policy position with the EU. The EU’s Commission states that:

“Turkey has continued alignment with Common Foreign and Security Policy statements, declarations and demarches. Turkey maintained its efforts to promote regional stability in line with EU policies. Turkey shares the EU efforts to ensure stability in Iraq. However, due to Turkish concerns on lack of security at the border, relations with Iraq present challenges. Turkey supports the European Neighbourhood Policy” (The European Commission, Turkey 2007 Progress Report, 2007:73-74).

They have a close cooperation on security issues, such as peacekeeping operations, energy issue, organized crime and environmental problems. They are involved together in activities to combat illegal immigration, drug smuggling and human trafficking, which are central issues in the EU's border management policy. Turkey has also a significant role for providing security for the EU’s energy needs. ‘Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline (2006), Nabucco Project, Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria (be functioning in 2013) and Black Sea-Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline (2007)’ (Muftuler-Bac, 2007:20) would reduce European energy dependence on Russia. The External Relations of European Commission highlights the geo-strategic position of Turkey for the EU’s energy security:

“Turkey is of strategic importance for the security of energy supplies to the EU, lying at the crossroads of various existing and future pipelines carrying both oil and gas from many core producer regions, namely Russia, the Caspian Sea, the Middle East and Northern Africa” (The European Commission, External Relations, 2007:8).
In terms of security and defence policies, Gasparini and Silvestri argue that the EU and Turkey have common goals at the following issues:

- A fight against international terrorism of radical Islamic roots;
- The promotion of non-proliferation regimes and policies, in particular towards Iran;
- The stabilization of the Mediterranean and Middle East;
- The solution of the Israeli-Palestine dispute;
- The stabilization of a unified Iraq;
- The deterrence of possible state-to-state conflicts and border dispute;
- The cooperation of military and security forces for civil protection against man-made and natural catastrophes (Gasparini and Silvestri, 2006:72).

In general, ‘Turkey’s military requirements match to those of the EU military requirements as a consequence of conceptual and doctrinal overlap. Turkey and Europe, under the umbrella of NATO, have been combined defence planning, joint exercises, common practices and joint command and control’ (Erguvenc, 2006:82). This ensures convergences in many respects between two parts.

Therefore, Turkey’s accession to the EU would be important implications on the EU’s security and defence policies. Muftuler-Bac claims that ‘Turkey’s membership to the EU would enhance the EU’s defence capabilities and increase its credibility as a foreign policy actor because of its geographical location, its military capabilities and its unique character as a secular democracy with a Muslim population’ (Muftuler-Bac, 2007:4)

Besides contribution to the EU-led operations, Turkey has significant potential to enhance the EU’s civilian power aspects. ‘Turkey plays a unique role in Europe where it brings together different cultures around a common understanding. It is also for this reason that Turkey is an
active participant to the UN project of Alliance of Civilizations29, (Muftuler-Bac, 2007:21). Turkey is the only Muslim-majority state in the Western ally in the Islamic Conference Organization. It can be argued that, ‘membership of Turkey would disprove the theory that the EU is a Christian Club, and help to decrease the tension between the Islamic and Christian world’ (Senyucel & Koknel, 2006:3). Thus, Turkey’s EU membership can be an important step to fight against international terrorism. In addition, former French minister for European Affairs Alain Lamassoure stressed the importance Turkey for the EU:

“At the crossroads of the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East, and the door of Central Asia, it holds a strategic position which gives it a role of major importance, on the one hand as a pole of stability in this particularly troubled region and, on the other, as a moderating element in the many regional conflicts as its doorstep” (cited in Kramer, 2000:XII).

Nevertheless, Turkey’s accession would also have negative effects on the EU in terms of security issues. Due to Turkey, the EU’s borders will enlarge to very problematic areas such as the Caucasus and the Middle East. Turkey is a buffer zone between the EU and one of the most hot spots of the World. It is highlighted that ‘Turkey’s location would give the European Union a front-state character in the world’s largest crisis region’ (Gasparini & Silvestri, 2006:65).

29 The Alliance of Civilizations initiative launched by the former Secretary General of the United Nations in July, 2005, which aims to facilitate harmony and dialogue by emphasizing the common values of different cultures and religions, is a direct response to that need. With its deep-rooted tradition of mutual understanding, tolerance, dialogue and respect for other cultures and religions, Turkey has undertaken to co-sponsor this initiative together with Spain (Turkish MFA, 2007:2).
5. CONCLUSION

There have been changes in the concept of security due to the fact that new and complex threats emerged in the late twentieth century. In contemporary world, besides conventional war and military attack; nuclear attack, human and drug trafficking, illegal migration, international terrorism, environmental problems, economic crises and natural disasters and pandemics became subjects of security. Some big events such as World War II, collapse of the Soviet Union, Bosnia War, 9/11 terrorist attack have caused drastic changes in threat perceptions and policy preferences.

In addition to military force, several additional policy instruments are now available to address new threats facing world: bilateral and multilateral cooperation, diplomacy, international agreements, financial-humanitarian aid, peacekeeping operations, promotion of good governance and democracy, and political-economic sanctions.

In this context, the European Union has emerged as a good example of how to manage different nations and states peacefully and how to ensure stability. Its economic power and new political developments after the end of the Cold War encouraged the establishment of a common security policy among the member states of the EU. Conflicts inside Europe, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the threat of international terrorism have accelerated improvements regarding common security and defence policies of the EU. Although there are still some differences among the member states, the declaration of European Security Strategy is an important step in the process of establishing a common security policy and the emergence of the EU as a global player. The EU declared through the ESS that effective multilateralism, cooperation with other states and international organizations, and active policy are the main tools to meet the new threats facing Europe.
Turkey, on the one hand, has attempted to ensure political and economic stability through EU membership; on the other hand, it has coped with domestic threats facing the country. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Turkey shaped its security and defence policy as a reaction to the impact of the war. Hence, defending territorial integrity and protecting independence of the new Turkish Republic were the key objectives of foreign and security policies. During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was the gravest threat facing the country. Its NATO membership was the main deterrence power of Turkey against the Soviet threat during this era.

After the end of the Cold War and collapse of the communist bloc, Turkey found itself a volatile region. Surrounded by the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus, it has been at the centre of several unstable regions. The Bosnian and Kosovo crises in the Balkans, Arab-Israeli conflicts, the power vacuum in Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic conflicts in Georgia, Iran’s attempts to acquire nuclear power, have all presented risks to Turkey and have directly or indirectly threatened its stability. In addition, Turkey has its own domestic security problems, such as the Kurdish and Cyprus issues.

During the 1990s, Turkey basically pursued a ‘passive’ and ‘wait and see policy’ about developments in its immediate neighbourhood, and as a ‘coercive regional power’, it was characterised by a ‘readiness to employ force, using the threats of military force and other confrontational tools of foreign policy’ (Kirisci, 2006:13). For instance, its policies on the Cyprus issue and terrorism were generally perceived in this context by western states and the EU.

However, after the accession of Turkey as an EU candidate country in 1999, it’s foreign and security policy has begun to change in the direction of the EU policies. EU’s candidacy is one of the significant reasons in changes of Turkish policy. Furthermore, due to uncertainty in its
environment after the 9/11 attack, Turkish rulers believe that Turkey cannot meet new the threats facing the country through unilateral and military power alone. There is a consensus among Turkish authorities for meeting the threats posed to Turkey’s security: proactive multilateralism and soft power instruments. The survey, conducted for this study, mainly supports the secondary sources. The Turkish elite are now broadly agreed with the government policies about the main security threats and policy preferences.

Based on the secondary sources, the government policies and statements, I argue that Turkey's threat perceptions and security policies have tended to converge with Europe's in the following ways:

1- The EU and Turkey have similar kinds of security threat perceptions since ‘they share the same area of concern’ (Erguvenc, 2006:77). The Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and East Mediterranean are all common concerns of Turkey and the EU. In addition, they need closer cooperation in combating human and drug trafficking, illegal migration, environmental and pandemics issues due to common borders. Turkey's definition of current threat is similar to that in the European Security Strategy. Terrorism is at the top of the list of their security concerns; not only have terrorists attacked London and Madrid, but they also targeted Istanbul in 2003.

2- Turkey has started to pursue proactive and constructive policies by promoting bilateral and multilateral cooperation with its neighbouring countries. Traditionally known as a ‘status quo power’ (Kirisci, 2006:49) in security policy, it has actually adopted a policy called ‘zero problems with neighbours’ (Kirisci, 2006:50); the Multinational Peace Force for the South East Europe and the Balkan Regional Brigade (SEEBRIG), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, the Blackseafor and Black Sea Harmony are some

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30 ‘Bomb attacks on the British consulate and the HSBC Bank headquarters in Istanbul have left at least 27 dead and up to 400 injured. The Turkish authorities say the attacks were carried out by suicide bombers, reportedly linked to al-Qaeda’ (BBC News, 20 November 2003).
examples of regional cooperation projects, which are actively promoted by Turkey. In addition, Turkey has attempted to develop its bilateral relationships with Greece, Russia, Syria, Iran and Georgia by following active diplomacy. ‘The main objective of these projects is to enhance Turkey’s foreign security, defence and political relations as well as promote cooperation and dialogue in the region’ (Gozen, 2003:19). It has pursued a policy of trying to solve disagreements peacefully.

The Turkish policymakers, like European authorities, have preferred “soft” over “hard” power instruments to address challenges from regional instabilities to Iran’s nuclear power acquisition. Besides, Turkey has adopted an EU-oriented policy on the Iraq issue and did not support the US unilateralist approach towards Iraq. Thus, in 2003, the Turkish parliament did not allow the US army to intervene Iraq by crossing the Turkish border.

3- Turkey has begun to host negotiations between Israel-Palestine, Armenia-Azerbaijan and Afghanistan-Pakistan in order to help resolve problems peacefully. Regarding Iran’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons, Turkey has clearly supported a diplomatic solution. It desires a stable and democratic Iraq and has supported the preservation of Iraq’s unity and independence. Although there are still some disagreements with Greece, a détente process started at the beginning of 2000 and the prime ministries of two countries exchanged goodwill visits.

4- The Turkish rulers believe in the importance of international organizations in struggling against the new threats. Thus, Turkey is a member of all international organizations whose objectives are to ensure peace and stability at regional and international level. It is a member of the UN, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe and an associate member of the WEU.
Turkey has enthusiastically supported the role of the UN, NATO and the EU in order to cope with global security threats after the September 11 era. It is actively engaged in peacekeeping operations in various part of world, such as in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Particularly in Afghanistan, ‘Turkey has been one of the leading force contributors since the foundation of ISAF. A former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet Cetin served as NATO’s first Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan for four consecutive terms’ (Turkish MFA, 2007:23).

Furthermore, it is a signatory to international conventions, such as Non-Proliferation Treaty, Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

5- There has also been harmonization between Turkey and the EU in struggling against organized crime including human and drug trafficking, fraud and cyber crimes. Turkish institutions have close relationships with EU institutions, such as Europol and Eurojust on asylum and migration issues, and judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters.

Nevertheless, there are a few divergences about some issues between Turkey and the EU. Policy of Turkey on the Cyprus issue and its response to the PKK are the main issues at which Turkey partly diverges from the EU’s approach. In general, the EU’s main allegations are that Turkey blocked the solution process in Cyprus and that it tries to solve terror problem through hard power tools. However, Turkey has pursued new policies on the Cyprus issue, and openly advocated the UN Plan regarding the reunification of Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriots voted for the plan in 2003.

On the terror issue, Turkey has launched several short-term military operations against PKK in Northern Iraq in the past 15 years. Although, Turkey declares that it does not have a claim on Iraq territory but is acting only to confront threats to its security, its military operations have been criticized by some EU’s member states. More soft power instruments against the terrorism have
been demanded by the EU. Therefore, between 2001 and 2003, the Turkish Parliament passed a series of reforms, such as lifting the ban on Kurdish and other languages broadcasts; amendments to the penal code and anti-terrorism law; lifting the death penalty; and legalising instruction in languages other than Turkish. In addition to military measures, Turkish governments have announced and implemented several economic and social programs in southern Turkey to prevent PKK activities. These new security responses clearly demonstrate the radical shifts that have taken place in Turkish security policy.

Military expenditure and the size of military forces in Turkey, even if both have been decreasing recently, are still pretty higher than those of the EU and its four leading states. Besides, Turkey has contributed considerable financial aid to UN peacekeeping operations; however, it is lower than EU development assistance to poor countries.

Although there is still a gap between Turkey and the EU in terms of security threat perceptions and responses to these threats, this dissertation argued that the differences between the two have narrowed since the accession process commenced for Turkey. As Turkey gets closer to EU membership, it’s foreign and security policies are converging with those of the EU. This indicates that, if Turkey were an EU member state, it would feel less dependent on its military power for its security; thus, its military expenditures and the size of its military forces would likely decrease, since membership of the Union would provide a political power and prestige for Turkey at international arena. Furthermore, membership would clearly contribute to the solution of the Cyprus and Aegean disputes between Turkey and Greece, Turkey would actively join the decision-making mechanism of the ESDP, and it would pursue more democratic methods on Kurdish issue.

Finally, Turkey is a pivotal country in the region and has played a stabiliser role from Central Asia to the Balkans. Any instability in Turkey could easily undermine stability in the Balkans, the
Middle East and the Caucasus. Thus, Turkey has been a critical player for European security in the volatile region, and it is an important partner for the EU in the implementation of the ESS and ENP. The EU needs the support of Turkey as much as Turkey needs the support of the EU in fighting against global and complex threats.
APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Please choose from the list no more than 5 of the gravest threats facing Turkey today and rank order them (1 the most grave, 5 the least). (Please put the members in the appropriate boxes).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THREATS</th>
<th>Probability of threat event in 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biological/Chemical Attack</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conventional War</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminalisation of the Economy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyber Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic Instability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man-made Environmental Threats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migratory Pressures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcotics Trafficking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Disasters and Pandemics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist attacks against Critical Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist attacks against State or Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. What are the three most appropriate policy instruments to meet the five security threats identified above for the year 2007 (you can give more than one policy instrument for each threat)? (Please tick the appropriate boxes).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Diplomatic</th>
<th>Economic and Financial Assistance</th>
<th>Police cooperation and intelligence sharing</th>
<th>Traditional Military</th>
<th>Special Operations</th>
<th>Other (please specify)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

31 68 respondents answered the questions of survey.
3. How important is the EU at present to address the security threats facing Europe today? (Please tick the appropriate boxes).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>EU Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not important at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological/Chemical Attack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminalisation of the Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Man-made Environmental Threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorist attacks against State or Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Are national defence budgets of the appropriate size to meet the security threats your country faces today?
   
   Too large [ ]  Just about right [ ]  Too little [ ]

5. Does the existing distribution of budgetary resources within the defence budget meet national security needs?
   
   Yes [ ]  No [ ]

6. If no, is too much or too little being spent on:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Too much</th>
<th>Just about right</th>
<th>Too little</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Res.&amp;Dev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Could a more autonomous ESDP weaken NATO further?
   
   Not at all [ ]  Little [ ]  Some [ ]  Very much [ ]  Don’t know [ ]
8. Will a weaker NATO lead to a retrenchment of the American commitment to the European Security?

Yes ☐ Maybe ☐ No ☐ Don’t know ☐

9. Is the American commitment to European Security?

- Essential ☐
- Very Important ☐
- Important ☐
- Not very Important ☐
- Inessential ☐

10. What pattern of interstate interaction best describes how your country is meeting its security challenges? (1: Solely unilateral, 5: Strictly bilateral, 9: Always multilateral; numbers in between: intermediate stages)

Please mark your country’s position on the following line:

Solely unilateral strictly bilateral Always multilateral

11. Does your nation’s government conceive of security narrowly (confined primarily to issues where ‘hard’ power is required) or broadly (where ‘soft’ power is necessary)? (1: narrow, 5: medium, 9: very broad; numbers in between: intermediate stages)

Please mark your country’s position on the following line:

Narrow Medium Very Broad
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Turkish MFA, (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), (last updated: 10 November 2007), Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy, available online at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Synopsis/SYNOPSIS.htm, (accessed 20 November 2007).


